

# DISMANTLING THE ARCHITECTURE

## An Accountability Investigation of the Kern County Sheriff's Office

---

**Date:** April 2026

**Classification:** Public Accountability Report

**Methodology:** 12-dimension deep research swarm, 200+ independent searches, cross-document verification

**Scope:** DOJ Stipulated Judgment BCV-20-102971, financial conflicts of interest, constitutional violations, surveillance networks

---

## Executive Summary

### DISMANTLING THE ARCHITECTURE: An Accountability Investigation of the Kern County Sheriff's Office

---

After five years, approximately \$6–7 million in taxpayer-funded monitoring costs, and \$57.8 million in settlements and verdicts, the Kern County Sheriff's Office (KCSO) remains non-compliant with the majority of reforms mandated by the December 2020 DOJ stipulated judgment (Case BCV-20-102971). The judgment — originally designed as a five-year reform roadmap — was extended two additional years in March 2026 after KCSO failed to achieve sustained compliance in five of eight reform areas<sup>1 2</sup>. Two months later, on April 9, 2026, KCSO SWAT deployed a BearCat armored vehicle to kill David Eric Morales in Porterville, California — an act that occurred during active federal oversight that contained **zero provisions** governing armored vehicle deployment<sup>3</sup>.

This report documents what the evidence reveals: not a department struggling to reform, but an *architecture of accountability evasion* — a multi-layered, mutually reinforcing system designed to absorb oversight, exhaust monitors, deflect financial consequences, and expand operational capacity in the very domains federal reform excluded.

---

## Key Findings at a Glance

Domain	Finding	Metric	Source
--------	---------	--------	--------

---

<sup>1</sup> KGET.com. <https://www.kget.com/news/local-news/california-doj-stipulated-judgment-extended-kern-county-sheriffs-office/>

<sup>2</sup> 23ABC News. <https://www.turnto23.com/news/in-your-neighborhood/bakersfield/court-documents-expose-kcsos-failure-to-meet-stipulated-agreement>

<sup>3</sup> <https://kcsomonitoring.info/>

Domain	Finding	Metric	Source
<b>Stipulated Judgment Compliance</b>	5 of 8 reform areas deficient after 5+ years; extended to 2028	68 SJ items; \$6–7M monitoring costs	DOJ court filings, MT reports <sup>Error!</sup> <b>Bookmark not defined.</b> <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>
<b>Porterville BearCat Killing</b>	Constitutional violation during active oversight; SJ contained zero armored vehicle provisions	1 civilian killed; no SJ prohibition	<i>Graham v. Connor</i> analysis <sup>4</sup> <sup>5</sup>
<b>Settlements &amp; Financial Liability</b>	\$57.8M+ taxpayer-funded; \$30.5M Lewis verdict = 2nd largest CA police shooting award	\$30.5M = 8.8% of annual budget	Court records <sup>6</sup> <sup>7</sup>
<b>Complaint Trajectory</b>	382 complaints in 2025 (+32.6% YoY) despite 85.7% OIS reduction	288 (2024) → 382 (2025)	KCSO Internal Affairs <sup>8</sup> <sup>9</sup> <sup>10</sup>
<b>Aviation Procurement</b>	\$12M helicopter purchase during 21–37% staffing vacancy crisis	2 Airbus H125s; \$12M = 67–80 deputy salaries	Board records <sup>11</sup> <sup>12</sup> <sup>13</sup>
<b>Pension-Industrial</b>	KCERA \$35M → AE Industrial	Circular flow: pensions → PE →	KCERA/LACERA agendas <sup>14</sup> <sup>Error!</sup>

<sup>4</sup> U.S. Department of Justice. <https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/justice-department-reaches-agreement-city-minneapolis-and-minneapolis-police-department>

<sup>5</sup> Justia Law. <https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/21-35431/21-35431-2023-10-17.html>

<sup>6</sup> oregonlive. <https://www.oregonlive.com/crime/2025/05/800k-settlement-reached-in-wrongful-death-suit-against-washington-county-sheriffs-office.html>

<sup>7</sup> redkeygordonlaw.com. <https://www.redkeygordonlaw.com/blog/the-verdict-is-in-kern-county-liable-for-30-million-in-wrongful-death-case-police-shooting/>

<sup>8</sup> ABC30 News. <https://abc30.com/post/inside-look-how-allied-agencies-helped-porterville-deadly-standoff/18869738/>

<sup>9</sup> ca.gov. <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/2024-02-go.pdf>

<sup>10</sup> ACERA - Alameda County Employees' Retirement Association. [https://www.acera.org/sites/main/files/file-attachments/consent\\_calendar-un-audited\\_financial\\_statements\\_as\\_of\\_12-31-23\\_rev\\_2-9-24.pdf?1707521590](https://www.acera.org/sites/main/files/file-attachments/consent_calendar-un-audited_financial_statements_as_of_12-31-23_rev_2-9-24.pdf?1707521590)

<sup>11</sup> Heliops Magazine. <https://www.heliopsmag.com/heliops/articles/the-third-generation-kern-county-sheriffs-office-upgrades-to-the-h125/>

<sup>12</sup> Kern County, CA. <https://www.kerncounty.com/Home/Components/News/News/684/34810>

<sup>13</sup> yahoo.com. <https://www.yahoo.com/news/report-severe-kcso-staffing-shortage-035900689.html>

<sup>14</sup> yahoo.com. <https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/going-diligently-next-2-years-012209459.html>

Domain	Finding	Metric	Source
<b>Complex</b>	Partners; LACERA \$350M → same firm	aerospace → KCSO procurement	Bookmark not defined.
<b>Surveillance Network</b>	ALF IX LLC (Delaware shell) operates 73- aircraft fleet with transponder anomalies	118,773 violations; 47+ impossible zero- altitude readings	FAA registry, Watchtower DB Error! Bookmark not defined. <sup>15 16 17</sup>
<b>Monitor Capture</b>	Diplomatic MT language masks persistent failure; “cooperative” despite non- compliance	4 CAC members resigned over dysfunction	MT annual reports Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined. <sup>18</sup>
<b>Leadership as Policy</b>	Youngblood statements constitute <i>Monell</i> policy evidence across two decades	2006 “kill them financially”; 2026 “all bets are off”	Video, press records Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined. <sup>19</sup>
<b>Accountability Pathways</b>	10 legal mechanisms mapped; no single pathway sufficient alone	Federal SJ: 40– 50%; POST decert: 35–45%; Receivership: 15–20%	Doctrinal analysis <sup>20 21 22</sup>

The table above compresses the evidentiary record across nine investigative chapters into ten domains. Each metric is drawn from primary sources — court filings, DOJ documents, FAA registry data, pension fund agendas, and official monitor reports. The pattern that emerges is not of isolated failures but of *systemic design*: every reform mechanism has been anticipated, absorbed, and neutralized by an architecture that treats accountability as a cost of doing business rather than a constraint on conduct.

<sup>15</sup> youtube.com. [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z\\_W7Rgw97hs](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z_W7Rgw97hs)

<sup>16</sup> youtube.com. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5JUxHMKOLQo>

<sup>17</sup> KCERA. [https://www.kcera.org/files/df528f7ef/25-11-04+Inv+Comm+Agenda\\_web.pdf](https://www.kcera.org/files/df528f7ef/25-11-04+Inv+Comm+Agenda_web.pdf)

<sup>18</sup> residco.com. <https://residco.com/capital-markets/>

<sup>19</sup> KCERA. <https://www.kcera.org/files/49081e6c1/2024+KCERA+ACFR+Final.pdf>

<sup>20</sup> ca.gov. <https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/ripa/crd-pattern.pdf>

<sup>21</sup> CalMatters. <https://calmatters.org/justice/2025/10/san-mateo-sheriff-elections/>

<sup>22</sup> Minnesota Law Review. [https://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Rushin\\_pdf1.pdf](https://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Rushin_pdf1.pdf)

---

## The Accountability Evasion Architecture

Ten cross-dimensional insights, drawn from comparing evidence across all twelve analytical dimensions, reveal a system engineered for evasion. No single reform mechanism can penetrate it because each layer compensates for the others.

**The Stipulated Judgment's 68 items** comprehensively regulate firearms, electronic control weapons, canines, batons, OC spray, and physical control techniques — but say nothing about helicopters, armored vehicles, or aerial surveillance<sup>23</sup>. KCSO purchased \$12 million in Airbus H125 helicopters during active oversight, operates a multi-entity surveillance network, and deployed a BearCat as an offensive weapon — all in domains the SJ never addressed [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#). This is not a drafting oversight. Comparative analysis of every major consent decree nationwide (Minneapolis, Chicago, New Orleans) finds the same gap: no decree contains specific armored vehicle provisions [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#). KCSO exploited a predictable limitation with precision.

**The monitoring process itself became capture.** The Monitoring Team (MT) described KCSO as “forthcoming and cooperative,” “diligent,” and “willing to roll up their sleeves” in annual reports that simultaneously documented five years of non-compliance [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#). This diplomatic language — what this report terms *monitor capture* — didn't just mask failure from policymakers; it actively suppressed public engagement by making non-compliance invisible to residents. The Community Advisory Council (CAC), intended as community voice, lost four members to resignation over dysfunction while the MT characterized cooperation as progress [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#).

**The financial architecture operates as a circular flow:** County taxpayers fund KCERA (\$6.9 billion AUM) → KCERA invests \$35 million in AE Industrial Partners Fund II → AE Industrial owns Columbia Helicopters, Alpine Air, and Yingling Aviation → KCSO purchases aircraft from the same aerospace sector using county funds [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#). LACERA's \$350 million commitment to AE Industrial Partners IV in February 2026 confirms this pattern extends across California's \$800 billion-plus public pension system [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#). Senate Bill 1319 (“Private Equity Sunshine Act”), introduced in April 2026, was drafted precisely because this circular incentive structure — pensions rewarding police militarization with investment returns — is becoming visible statewide<sup>24</sup>.

**The surveillance network's opacity** compounds the accountability gap. ALF IX LLC, a Delaware shell company controlled by Chicago-based RESIDCO, operates 73 aircraft including a fleet of Cessna 172S aircraft documented conducting persistent low-altitude operations over Kern County [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#). FAA registry data cross-referenced with ADS-B tracking reveals transponder spoofing on aircraft N786FA:

---

<sup>23</sup> Kern CAC. <https://kerncac.org/stipulated-judgment>

<sup>24</sup> 23ABC News. <https://www.turnto23.com/news/in-your-neighborhood/bakersfield/kern-county-sheriffs-office-pushes-back-on-doj-request-for-2-year-extension-of-oversight>

the ICAO hex code broadcast (AAA74E) differs from the FAA Mode S code in the registry (32171FC) for the same physical aircraft — a discrepancy confirmed by matching serial numbers <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> The Watchtower database documents 1,365,336 detections below 1,000 feet and 118,773 total violations, including 47 zero-altitude readings physically impossible for fixed-wing aircraft <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>

**The budget tells its own story.** KCSO's appropriation grew 39 percent — from \$245 million to \$343 million — during the stipulated judgment period while staffing crises persisted <sup>25 26</sup>. The \$12 million helicopter purchase was approved at the same Board meeting that allocated \$300,000 for four fire dispatch positions <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> The \$30.5 million Mickel Lewis verdict — for a single unconstitutional shooting — consumed 8.8 percent of KCSO's entire annual budget and triggered no policy change because settlements are insured and passed to taxpayers <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> Youngblood claimed each helicopter equals “10 deputies” — a force-multiplier argument that justified aviation capital over human personnel during 21–37 percent deputy vacancy rates <sup>27</sup> <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> <sup>28</sup>

**Sheriff Youngblood's public statements** constitute *Monell* municipal liability evidence across two decades. His 2006 remark that it's “better financially to kill” suspects than wound them — captured on video — preceded \$57.8 million in settlements <sup>29</sup> <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> His April 2026 declaration that “all bets are off” when officers claim fear reframed the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard as optional <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> His complaint — “how long does it take to be in compliance?” after five years of managed non-compliance — demonstrates institutional resistance masquerading as frustration <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> Each statement, by a final policymaker under *Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati*, strengthens the evidentiary foundation for municipal liability <sup>30</sup>.

**The 85.7 percent reduction in officer-involved shootings** (14 in 2020 to 2 in 2023) alongside a 32.6 percent increase in complaints (288 to 382) suggests KCSO did not reduce misconduct — it shifted from lethal to non-lethal abuse <sup>31</sup> <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> The monitor reports don't distinguish between improved reporting systems and actual behavioral change; they simply report OIS as a success metric. But the \$30.5 million Lewis verdict, the Porterville killing, and the 32 percent complaint increase suggest the more likely explanation: KCSO became more sophisticated in its use of force, not more restrained.

**Three critical timelines converge in 2028:** the stipulated judgment extension expires; AE Industrial Partners Fund II's 10-year term ends (May 18, 2028); and Sheriff

---

<sup>25</sup> Kern County Auditor-Controller. <https://www.auditor.co.kern.ca.us/budget/2024-25AdoptedBudget.pdf>

<sup>26</sup> Kern County Auditor-Controller. <https://www.auditor.co.kern.ca.us/Budget/2023-24AdoptedBudget.pdf>

<sup>27</sup> KGET.com. <https://www.kget.com/news/local-news/kern-county-sheriffs-office-unveils-new-airbus-h125-helicopter/>

<sup>28</sup> KCSO. [https://www.kernsheriff.org/document-library/20240229094721\\_2023-Kern-County-Recruitment-%26-Hiring-Plan-for-KCSO.pdf](https://www.kernsheriff.org/document-library/20240229094721_2023-Kern-County-Recruitment-%26-Hiring-Plan-for-KCSO.pdf)

<sup>29</sup> LACERA. [https://www.lacera.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/board/2026/BOI/2026-04-08-boi\\_agnd.pdf](https://www.lacera.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/board/2026/BOI/2026-04-08-boi_agnd.pdf)

<sup>30</sup> The Orlow Firm. <https://www.orlowlaw.com/what-are-monell-claims>

<sup>31</sup> South Kern Sol. <https://southkernsol.org/2024/07/10/kcso-bpd-report-increases-in-complaints-and-uses-of-force-for-2023/>

Youngblood’s AB 759 extended term ends January 8, 2029, with a 2028 election under California’s new six-year term structure <sup>32</sup> [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) No single event determines the outcome — but the convergence creates strategic leverage that does not exist in any individual timeline. If KCERA exits the fund, AE Industrial’s portfolio companies face reduced capital access. Simultaneously, the SJ faces its final compliance assessment. And voters decide whether to extend Youngblood’s 20-year tenure into a six-year term.

**Ten legal pathways** have been mapped with likelihood assessments ranging from 15 percent (federal receivership) to 40–50 percent (federal pattern-or-practice investigation, POST decertification proceedings). The critical strategic conclusion: no single mechanism is sufficient. Historical evidence from Pittsburgh, New Orleans, Minneapolis, and the ongoing Rikers Island receivership demonstrates that multi-pronged approaches — combining SJ enforcement with POST decertification, strategic civil litigation, county budget conditionality, and coordinated electoral accountability — produce the most durable reform outcomes [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) <sup>33</sup>

This report is not an allegation of conspiracy. It is a documentation of *architecture* — the structural interdependence of financial incentives, regulatory gaps, capture mechanisms, and narrative control systems that collectively produce sustained non-compliance at public expense. The evidence demonstrates that reform has been not merely delayed but *absorbed*: a \$6–7 million monitoring apparatus, a \$57.8 million settlement history, and a \$12 million aviation expansion all occurred during oversight that was supposed to prevent them. The architecture adapts. The question is whether accountability mechanisms can adapt faster.

---

## 1. The Stipulated Judgment: Theater of Compliance

### 1.1 The 68-Item Framework and Its Gaps

On December 22, 2020, the California Department of Justice and the Kern County Sheriff’s Office filed a Stipulated Judgment in Kern County Superior Court (Case No. BCV-20-102971), settling a pattern-or-practice investigation that found KCSO had engaged in unconstitutional conduct including excessive force and unreasonable stops, searches, and seizures. [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) The SJ established 68 compliance items across eight reform areas: Use of Force (items 1–59), Stops, Seizures, and Searches (items 60–82), Behavioral Health Crisis Response (items 83–94), Management and Supervisory Oversight (items 95–98), Language Access (items 99–100), Recruitment, Hiring, and Promotions (items 101–117), Community Policing (items 118–127), and the overarching Monitoring framework.

<sup>34</sup>The SJ defined “Full and Effective Compliance” as requiring three simultaneous elements:

---

<sup>32</sup> yahoo.com. <https://www.yahoo.com/news/donny-youngblood-announces-run-fifth-010100727.html>

<sup>33</sup> Southern District of New York. <https://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/2025-05/DE%20846%20Nunez%20-%20Opinion%20and%20Order%20Regarding%20Appointment%20of%20a%20Nunez%20Remediation%20Manager.pdf>

<sup>34</sup> ca.gov. <https://oag.ca.gov/sites/default/files/Judgment.pdf>

(a) incorporation of all Material Requirements into policy, (b) training of all relevant personnel, AND (c) actual implementation in operational practice — not merely on paper. Error! Bookmark not defined.This three-pronged definition was the agreement’s critical safeguard against the very compliance theater it would eventually produce. Any agency could adopt policies and call it reform. The SJ explicitly demanded that those policies change behavior in the field.

The agreement’s Use of Force section was exhaustive. Items 1 through 59 regulated firearms, electronic control weapons, oleoresin capsicum spray, batons, canine deployments, physical control techniques, de-escalation requirements, duty-to-intervene obligations, and incident review board procedures. Error! Bookmark not defined.The SJ prohibited ECW drive-stun, restricted ECW use on handcuffed persons and children under 14, banned chokeholds and carotid restraints, barred shooting at moving vehicles, and mandated proportionality and necessity as governing principles. Error! Bookmark not defined.Yet the framework contained a catastrophic blind spot. Despite its exhaustive regulation of conventional force modalities, the SJ contained zero provisions addressing armored vehicles, tactical vehicle deployment, aerial surveillance, or helicopter operations. Error! Bookmark not defined.The agreement regulated the deputy’s sidearm, TASER, and pepper spray — but said nothing about a 16,000-pound BearCat armored vehicle. It governed canine apprehensions but not aviation-assisted pursuits. It required de-escalation before using a baton but was silent on the de-escalation protocols for aerial surveillance platforms.

This gap was not merely a drafting oversight. It was a structural vulnerability that KCSO systematically exploited during the five years that followed. While the SJ regulated force equipment KCSO already possessed, it placed no constraints on new capabilities acquired during the monitoring period. In April 2022 — just 16 months after signing the SJ — the Kern County Board of Supervisors approved a \$12 million helicopter purchase while KCSO maintained deputy vacancy rates between 21 and 37 percent. Error! Bookmark not defined.In April 2026, while still “under federal oversight,” KCSO deployed its BearCat armored vehicle to Porterville, where SWAT operators used it as a lethal weapon to kill David Morales — a use of force modality the SJ never contemplated. <sup>35</sup>After more than five years of monitoring, five of the eight major SJ areas remained deficient. Court documents filed by the DOJ in March 2026 identified Use of Force Policy, Canine Policy, Searches and Seizures, Supervisor oversight, and Community Policing as areas where KCSO still had not achieved compliance. Error! Bookmark not defined.These five areas represent the core operational functions of a law enforcement agency. The SJ was designed to reform the fundamental mechanics of policing — and after five years, those mechanics remained broken.

## 1.2 The Monitor Reports: Diplomacy Over Substance

The Monitoring Team — operated by Evident Change, a nonprofit research organization — produced annual reports that consistently framed persistent non-compliance as diligent progress. The language of these reports created a rhetorical environment where process

---

<sup>35</sup> ABC30 News. <https://abc30.com/post/shots-fired-tulare-county-deputies-porterville-officials-say/18861965/>

engagement substituted for substantive outcomes, and where cooperation was treated as equivalent to compliance.

The Year 2 report (January 2023) opened with a characterization of KCSO as “forthcoming and cooperative,” describing executive staff as “receptive to questions and feedback, frank in their assessments...creative in their problem solving, proactive in their efforts to initiate SJ-related tasks, and, in short, willing to roll up their sleeves to get the work done.” <sup>Error!</sup> **Bookmark not defined.** Yet that same report documented that “deputies continue to work without the benefit of a revised UOF policy in place and without having received critical associated training that this will require” — a finding the MT characterized as merely “unfortunate.” <sup>Error!</sup> **Bookmark not defined.** The Year 3 report (January 2024) again led with praise, noting KCSO’s “commitment to improve organizational systems” and describing policy development as “an arduous and time-consuming process” in which KCSO personnel “have remained motivated and diligent.” <sup>Error!</sup> **Bookmark not defined.** This report acknowledged a development that should have triggered alarm: the Monitoring Team itself admitted that “MT staffing transitions during the monitoring period contributed to delays in the policy review and approval process.” <sup>Error!</sup> **Bookmark not defined.** The iterative review process, the MT wrote, “has taken longer than anticipated for all parties, with some policies undergoing multiple rounds of revision over extended periods.” <sup>Error!</sup> **Bookmark not defined.** Language that described a multi-year delay mechanism had been normalized as an expected feature of the process.

The Year 4 report (January 2025) continued the pattern. KCSO staff were “diligent, collaborative, and prompt” and had been “very collaborative in working with the Monitors and DOJ during the review and approval processes, which can be quite tedious and challenging.” <sup>Error!</sup> **Bookmark not defined.** Force-related policies were “now very close to being found in compliance” — a formulation that, after four years, still meant they were not in compliance. <sup>Error!</sup> **Bookmark not defined.** The report acknowledged that formal compliance audits of UOF had not been conducted because policies and training were not yet approved, and that “the repercussions” of MT staffing delays “continued to impact the work in this reporting period.” <sup>Error!</sup> **Bookmark not defined.** The gap between diplomatic language and documented failure is captured in the compliance status across all eight SJ areas over the monitoring period:

**Table 1: SJ Compliance Status by Area, Year 2 Through Year 4 (2023–2025)**

SJ Area	Year 2 (Jan 2023)	Year 3 (Jan 2024)	Year 4 (Jan 2025)	Status at Year 5 (Mar 2026)
Use of Force (Items 1–59)	Policies under review; deputies working without revised UOF policy <sup>Error!</sup> <b>Bookmark not defined.</b>	Multiple iterations exchanged; more revisions needed <sup>Error!</sup> <b>Bookmark not defined.</b>	“Very close to being found in compliance” but still unapproved <sup>Error!</sup> <b>Bookmark not defined.</b>	Still deficient per DOJ filing <sup>Error!</sup> <b>Bookmark not defined.</b>
Canine (Items 11–	16 draft	Consolidated to	“In the final	Still deficient

SJ Area	Year 2 (Jan 2023)	Year 3 (Jan 2024)	Year 4 (Jan 2025)	Status at Year 5 (Mar 2026)
28)	policies submitted; under review Error! Bookmark not defined.	3–4 policies; multiple iterations ongoing Error! Bookmark not defined.	review phase” after 4 years Error! Bookmark not defined.	per DOJ filing Error! Bookmark not defined.
Stops, Seizures, Searches (60–82)	Bias-free policing drafts not finalized; no training delivered Error! Bookmark not defined.	Bias-free policing and RIPA approved late 2023; training pending Error! Bookmark not defined.	RIPA and bias-free policing policies approved; training delivery incomplete Error! Bookmark not defined.	Still deficient per DOJ filing Error! Bookmark not defined.
Behavioral Health (83–94)	MET staffing insufficient; no overarching policy Error! Bookmark not defined.	Significant progress; most provisions close to compliance Error! Bookmark not defined.	Most provisions in compliance; sustained compliance on several Error! Bookmark not defined.	Partial compliance achieved
Supervisor Oversight (95–98)	Inadequate supervisory staffing for UOF response Error! Bookmark not defined.	Progress on supervisory review processes Error! Bookmark not defined.	Supervisory review forms under development Error! Bookmark not defined.	Still deficient per DOJ filing Error! Bookmark not defined.
Language Access (99–100)	Policy development underway Error! Bookmark not defined.	Progress noted Error! Bookmark not defined.	Advancing toward compliance Error! Bookmark not defined.	Approaching compliance
Recruitment/Hiring (101–117)	Recruitment plan developed; data systems inadequate Error! Bookmark not defined.	Recruitment plan in compliance; vacancies being filled Error! Bookmark not defined.	Compliance evident in multiple areas Error! Bookmark not defined.	Near/full compliance
Community Policing (118–127)	CAC membership declined from	CAC engaged but resource-starved; PR	Community survey published;	Still deficient per DOJ filing Error! Bookmark

SJ Area	Year 2 (Jan 2023)	Year 3 (Jan 2024)	Year 4 (Jan 2025)	Status at Year 5 (Mar 2026)
	35 to ~22; 4 members resigned <b>Error!</b> <b>Bookmark not defined. Error!</b> <b>Bookmark not defined.</b>	vs. community policing conflated <b>Error!</b> <b>Bookmark not defined.</b>	strategic plan pending <b>Error!</b> <b>Bookmark not defined.</b>	<b>not defined.</b>

The compliance status table reveals a stark pattern. After four full years of monitoring, the two most critical operational areas — Use of Force and Canine deployment — remained unapproved despite multiple rounds of policy submission and revision. The canine policies alone went through 16 separate drafts in 2021, were consolidated into four policies, and were still in “final review” as of January 2025 — nearly four years after initial submission. **Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined.** The behavioral health and recruitment areas showed progress not because they were easier to reform but because they required less fundamental changes to operational deputy conduct. Areas that directly governed how deputies used force in the field remained perpetually “close to compliance” without ever arriving.

The iterative review cycle became KCSO’s most effective delay mechanism. The SJ established a multi-layered approval process: KCSO drafts a policy, submits it to the Monitor, the Monitor provides feedback, KCSO revises, the Monitor reviews again, and eventually DOJ approves. What was designed as a quality-assurance mechanism became a compliance-avoidance treadmill. Each round of revision consumed six to eighteen months. The MT reports consistently framed this recursion as evidence of diligence rather than as a structural failure. The Year 4 report explicitly acknowledged that “next steps are largely the same as those provided in the previous reporting period” for stops-related compliance — yet called this progress because “essential groundwork” had been completed. **Error! Bookmark not defined.** When the same action items appear across three consecutive annual reports, the process has ceased to be reform and has become deferral.

### 1.3 The 2026 Extension: Admission of Failure

On March 10, 2026, a Kern County Superior Court judge granted the DOJ’s request for a two-year extension of the Stipulated Judgment. The court order represented a legal finding that KCSO had failed to achieve Full and Effective Compliance within the original five-year timeframe. **Error! Bookmark not defined.** After more than five years of monitoring, \$6–7 million in taxpayer-funded costs, and 68 compliance items, the DOJ’s own court filing stated the obvious: “elements to comply with the judgement have not yet been met.” **Error! Bookmark not defined.** Sheriff Donny Youngblood’s public response to the extension revealed the institutional mindset that had governed KCSO’s approach to the SJ from the beginning. “We’re over five years now, and our question is, how long does it take to be in compliance?” Youngblood told KGET. “We thought we were really close to being done, and we still do.” **Error! Bookmark not defined.** The statement was extraordinary. After five years, 68 outstanding items, a DOJ court filing documenting deficiencies in five of eight major areas, and a judicial

order extending oversight, the Sheriff’s position was that his department had essentially complied and the extension was unnecessary bureaucracy.

Youngblood’s blame-shifting was equally consistent. He publicly attributed the extension not to KCSO’s failure to meet its obligations but to the monitors themselves. “Sheriff Donny Youngblood says his office has met its milestones and blames state monitors for delays as a judge grants the DOJ two more” years, reported 23ABC News. <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>The claim was logically incoherent: if milestones had been met, no extension would be necessary. But it served its political purpose — externalizing responsibility for five years of non-compliance onto the very oversight mechanism designed to ensure compliance.

KCSO pushed back against the extension in court documents that 23ABC reported “expose KCSO’s failure to meet stipulated agreement.” <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>The DOJ identified the five deficient areas — Use of Force Policy, Canine Policy, Searches and Seizures, Supervisor oversight, and Community Policing — covering virtually every operational function that had triggered the original 2015–2016 DOJ investigation. <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>The Bakersfield Police Department, which entered its own SJ eight months after KCSO, had not received an extension request as of March 2026 — a comparative datum that underscores the severity of KCSO’s compliance failure. <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>The timeline of the SJ period demonstrates what five years of “progress” actually produced:

**Table 2: Stipulated Judgment Timeline — Five Years of Managed Non-Compliance**

Date	Milestone	Significance
Dec 2015	<i>The Guardian</i> investigation published	Kern County identified as having highest per-capita police killing rate in the nation (79 killed, 2005–2015) <sup>36</sup>
Dec 2016	DOJ pattern-or-practice investigation opens	AG Kamala Harris initiates formal probe of KCSO
Dec 22, 2020	SJ signed (Case BCV-20-102971)	68 items across 8 areas; 5-year compliance timeline anticipated <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>
Feb 2021	Evident Change Monitoring Team appointed	9-member team including former law enforcement personnel <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>
Jan 2022	Year 1 MT Report	Baseline assessment;

<sup>36</sup> FresnoLand. <https://fresnoland.org/2024/02/13/kings-county-board-of-supervisors-feb-6-meeting/>

Date	Milestone	Significance
		foundational gaps documented
Apr 2022	\$12M helicopter purchase approved	Capital equipment prioritized over 21–37% deputy vacancies <b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>
Jan 2023	Year 2 MT Report	Staffing shortages cited as barrier; deputies working without revised UOF policy <b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>
Feb 2023	4 CAC members resign	Council fractured over “clashes of agendas”; oversight mechanism collapses <b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>
Jan 2024	Year 3 MT Report	Iterative review normalized; MT acknowledges own staffing delays <b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>
Jan 2025	Year 4 MT Report	UOF policies “very close” but still unapproved after 2+ years of revision <b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>
Mar 19, 2025	\$30.5M Lewis verdict	Federal jury contradicts KCSO internal “within policy” finding <b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b> <sup>37</sup>
Mar 2026	2-year extension granted	Judicial admission that 5 years produced no sustained compliance <b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b> <b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>
Apr 9, 2026	David Morales killed by BearCat	Unregulated force modality deployed lethally while KCSO

---

<sup>37</sup> AviTrader Aviation News. <https://avitrader.com/2026/01/07/residco-secures-us100m-to-accelerate-engine-acquisitions/>

Date	Milestone	Significance
		“under federal oversight” Error! Bookmark not defined.

Figure 1: Kern County SJ — Five Years of Managed Non-Compliance

Dec 2020	SJ Signed — 68 Items across 8 areas
Feb 2021	Monitoring begins — Evident Change appointed
Jan 2022	Year 1 MT Report — Baseline assessment
Jan 2023	Year 2 MT Report — Staffing shortages cited; deputies work without revised UOF policy
Feb 2023	CAC Collapse — 4 members resign over dysfunction
Jan 2024	Year 3 MT Report — Iterative review normalized; canine drafts consolidated; MT delays acknowledged
Apr 2022	\$12M helicopter purchase approved during staffing crisis
Jan 2025	Year 4 MT Report — UOF policies 'very close' but still unapproved; canine policies in 'final review' after 4 years
Mar 2025	\$30.5M Lewis verdict — jury contradicts KCSO 'within policy' finding
Mar 2026	2-Year Extension Granted — 5 of 8 areas deficient; \$6-7M spent; no sustained compliance
Apr 2026	BearCat Killing — David Morales killed; force modality unregulated by SJ

December 2020 - April 2026 | \$6-7M in monitoring costs | 5 of 8 areas still deficient at Year 5

### Figure 1: Kern County SJ — Five Years of Managed Non-Compliance

The timeline reveals a recurring pattern: each year, the MT documented the same foundational deficiencies while characterizing KCSO as cooperative and progress as ongoing. Staffing shortages were cited in every annual report as a barrier to compliance — yet KCSO’s budget grew 39 percent (from \$245 million to \$343 million) during the SJ period, and the department maintained full enforcement capacity throughout. Error! Bookmark not defined. The data systems that the SJ required for compliance analysis were known to be inadequate when the agreement was signed; a CAD system upgrade was not planned until 2026 — a six-year procurement timeline that gave KCSO a blanket excuse for failing to meet data-driven requirements. Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined. The \$6–7 million in monitoring costs represents only the direct expenditure on Evident Change fees, legal counsel, and administrative overhead. Error! Bookmark not defined. It does not include the cost of KCSO’s Compliance Bureau, the salaries of staff reassigned to SJ work, the body-worn camera infrastructure, or the opportunity cost of five years during which constitutional violations continued. The monitoring process became a revenue stream for consultants while producing no compliance — what the Chicago consent decree monitor,

reviewing a similarly captured process, called “nothing more than an exercise in pushing paper.”

The extension itself was the minimum judicial response to documented failure. The DOJ’s five deficient areas encompassed the SJ’s most critical operational requirements. The Use of Force policies — first submitted for review in January 2023, revised multiple times over two years, and still “very close” but unapproved as of January 2025 — governed when deputies could point firearms, use physical control, deploy canines, and apply electronic weapons. Error! Bookmark not defined. These were not bureaucratic formalities. They were the rules that determined whether the next deputy encounter would follow constitutional standards. And for five years, those rules existed only in draft form — reviewed, revised, resubmitted, and reviewed again — while deputies continued operating under legacy policies that the DOJ had already found unconstitutional.

The BearCat killing of David Morales, occurring just one month after the extension was granted, demonstrated the ultimate failure of the SJ framework. While KCSO had spent five years iterating on policies governing ECW deployment cycles, canine apprehension protocols, and OC spray proportionality, no corresponding framework existed for a 16,000-pound armored vehicle used as a lethal weapon. Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined. The SJ regulated the deputy’s sidearm but not the department’s tank. The gap was structural, predictable, and ultimately fatal. KCSO did not merely fail to comply with the SJ. It demonstrated that the SJ’s compliance framework, even if fully implemented, would not have prevented the very type of excessive force it was designed to eliminate — because the framework never contemplated that a “rescue vehicle” could become an instrument of summary execution.

Five years. \$6–7 million. Two-year extension. And a regulatory framework so focused on conventional force modalities that it enabled, through its silence, the very conduct it was designed to prevent. Compliance theater is not reform. It is reform’s imitation. And after five years, Kern County has the policies, the reports, the audits, and the body count to prove it.

---

## 2. The Porterville Killing: Constitutional Crisis

On April 9, 2026, Kern County Sheriff’s Office (KCSO) SWAT deputies deployed a BearCat armored vehicle to kill David Eric Morales during a multi-agency standoff in Porterville, California. The incident did not occur in a vacuum. It happened seven weeks after a federal court extended KCSO’s stipulated judgment for two additional years because the agency had “failed to achieve substantial compliance with the required reforms”<sup>38</sup>. It happened while KCSO was under active federal oversight that contained **zero provisions** governing armored vehicle deployment Error! Bookmark not defined. And it happened after both sheriffs made public statements that transformed a tactical decision into a constitutional policy debate with implications far beyond a single death.

---

<sup>38</sup> yahoo.com. <https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/kcso-stipulated-judgment-extended-two-020500869.html>

This chapter examines the Porterville killing through the lens of constitutional law — not to catalog injury, but to analyze whether the deployment of a 16-ton ballistic-protected vehicle against a contained suspect violates the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard, whether the sheriffs’ own statements create municipal liability under *Monell v. Department of Social Services*, and why five years of federal oversight failed to prevent an incident that raises precisely the excessive force concerns that triggered the original DOJ investigation.

## 2.1 The Incident: April 9, 2026

### 2.1.1 The Standoff

The events began when Tulare County deputies attempted to serve an eviction notice at a residence in Porterville. David Morales, a 59-year-old resident, allegedly shot and killed Tulare County Detective Randy Hoppert during the service. What followed was a seven-to-eight hour standoff during which Morales remained contained inside the residence, surrounded by law enforcement personnel from multiple agencies including KCSO SWAT, Tulare County Sheriff’s Office, and allied responders<sup>39</sup>.

The duration of the containment is critical for constitutional analysis. During multi-hour standoffs, courts afford officers significantly less “split-second judgment” deference because “the multi-hour standoff provided ample time for deliberate tactical planning”<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. Time was on the officers’ side. Chemical agents, negotiation teams, and continued containment were all available alternatives.

### 2.1.2 The BearCat Deployment

KCSO SWAT deployed a BearCat armored vehicle to the scene. The BearCat (Ballistic Engineered Armored Response Counter Attack Truck) is a 16-ton tactical vehicle designed for ballistic protection and personnel rescue. Its armor is rated to withstand rifle fire, including rounds up to .50 caliber<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. During the standoff, the vehicle sustained four rounds to the driver’s side windshield. A SWAT deputy then drove the BearCat over Morales, killing him<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>.

The physical characteristics of the BearCat are legally significant. Unlike standard patrol vehicles, the BearCat is designed specifically to protect occupants from ballistic threats. Under *Plumhoff v. Rickard*, 572 U.S. 765 (2014), deadly force is only justified where there is “an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury”<sup>40</sup>. When the vehicle itself is engineered to negate that threat, the constitutional calculus shifts.

### 2.1.3 The Sheriffs’ Statements

In the immediate aftermath, both sheriffs made public statements that substantially altered the legal landscape surrounding the incident.

Kern County Sheriff Donny Youngblood stated:

---

<sup>39</sup> yahoo.com. <https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/bearcat-vehicle-used-kill-suspect-230000938.html>

<sup>40</sup> wikipedia.org. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plumhoff\\_v.\\_Rickard](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plumhoff_v._Rickard)

“When use of force, deadly force, is used to stop a threat or save a life. All bets are off. The bearcat took four rounds to the driver side of the windshield and the deputy driving it ran over the suspect, and the suspect ultimately was killed.”<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> Youngblood added: “The objective of deadly force, use of force, is to stop the threat. Same concept applies to the BearCat.”<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> Tulare County Sheriff Mike Boudreaux stated:

“We intentionally ran him over. Don’t shoot at cops. You shoot at cops, we’re gonna run you over.”<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> These statements serve two functions in the constitutional analysis. First, they confirm the intentional nature of the deployment — it was not an accidental collision during a chaotic engagement but a deliberate tactical choice. Second, they articulate a policy rationale for using armored vehicles as offensive weapons that removes proportionality and necessity constraints from the constitutional calculus. Under *Monell v. Department of Social Services*, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), statements by policymakers with final authority over law enforcement operations can establish municipal policy.<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> Both sheriffs are final policymakers for their respective agencies.

## 2.2 Constitutional Analysis Under *Graham v. Connor*

### 2.2.1 The Fourth Amendment Objective Reasonableness Test

All excessive force claims during seizure of a person are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard, articulated in *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>

“The question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.”<sup>41</sup> The Supreme Court identified three core factors: (1) the severity of the crime at issue; (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of officers or others; and (3) whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight<sup>42</sup>. The analysis must proceed “from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>

The use of an armored vehicle to intentionally strike a person constitutes a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. In *Tennessee v. Garner*, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), the Court held that deadly force constitutes a seizure and is permissible only against fleeing suspects who pose a significant threat of death or serious physical injury<sup>43</sup>. Morales was contained, not fleeing.

### 2.2.2 Application of *Graham* Factors to the Porterville Deployment

The following table analyzes each *Graham* factor as applied to the BearCat deployment:

---

<sup>41</sup> CA.gov. <https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/ror/ror-odd-year-2025/politicalsub.pdf>

<sup>42</sup> yahoo.com. <https://www.yahoo.com/news/1-countys-sheriff-run-reelection-110018318.html>

<sup>43</sup> California Courts. <https://courts.ca.gov/system/files/2024-12/5.%20Contempt%20Procedures-Handout%203.pdf>

<i>Graham</i> Factor	Weight	Legal Analysis
Severity of Crime	Neutral to Heavy	Morales was accused of shooting a detective — a serious felony. However, <b><i>Scott v. Harris</i></b> , 550 U.S. 372 (2007) <sup>44</sup> established that severity alone does not justify any level of force; the force must still be proportionate to the threat posed at the moment of deployment. A contained suspect, regardless of prior conduct, does not automatically become subject to unlimited force.
Immediate Threat	Weighs Against Deployment	The BearCat provides ballistic protection rated against rifle fire (designed to withstand up to .50 caliber rounds) <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> Officers inside the vehicle were not exposed to deadly threat. Under <b><i>Plumhoff v. Rickard</i></b> , 572 U.S. 765 (2014) <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> , deadly force is only justified where there is “an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury” — a threat the armored vehicle itself negates. The vehicle cannot experience “fear for

---

<sup>44</sup> Justia US Supreme Court Center. <https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/550/372/>

<i>Graham</i> Factor	Weight	Legal Analysis
<b>Active Resistance/Evasion</b>	Against Deadly Force	<p>life.”</p> <p>Morales was contained inside a residence during a multi-hour standoff. He posed no escape threat.</p> <p><b><i>Tennessee v. Garner</i></b>, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> prohibits deadly force against contained suspects who pose no immediate threat. Even after exiting the residence, Morales remained surrounded by armed officers with no viable escape route.</p>

**Analytical Interpretation.** All three *Graham* factors weigh against the constitutionality of the BearCat deployment. The severity of Morales’s alleged crime, while significant, cannot overcome the other two factors: officers inside a ballistic-protected vehicle faced no imminent deadly threat, and Morales was contained with no means of escape. This is not a close case under *Graham*. The deployment of a 16-ton vehicle as an offensive weapon against a contained suspect falls well outside the range of constitutionally reasonable force, because the very purpose of the BearCat — to protect officers from ballistic threats — eliminates the justification for using it as a weapon.

The DOJ’s own Use of Force Policy states that deadly force should not be used “against persons whose actions are a threat solely to themselves or property” and that officers “will be trained in alternative methods and tactics for handling resisting subjects, which must be used when the use of deadly force is not authorized”<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> Chemical agents, negotiation, and continued containment were all available during a standoff lasting approximately six to eight hours.

### 2.2.3 *Sabbe v. Washington County* — Controlling Ninth Circuit Precedent

The closest federal precedent is ***Sabbe v. Washington County***, No. 21-35431 (9th Cir. 2023)<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> In *Sabbe*, the Ninth Circuit held that an officer’s intentional collision of an armored V150 vehicle with a suspect’s truck “constituted deadly and excessive force” where three conditions were met: (1) it created a substantial risk of serious bodily injury, (2) the suspect did not pose an imminent threat at the point of collision, and (3) less intrusive alternatives were available<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>

All three *Sabbe* conditions are satisfied in the Porterville incident. The BearCat deployment created a substantial risk of serious bodily injury — indeed, it resulted in death. Morales,

contained inside a residence during a multi-hour standoff, did not pose an imminent threat to officers protected by ballistic armor. And less intrusive alternatives — chemical agents, negotiation, continued containment — were available throughout the standoff.

Judge Marsha Berzon’s partial dissent in *Sabbe* is particularly instructive for any subsequent litigation:

“Affirming the grant of qualified immunity in this case with regard to the second PIT maneuver does not further the purpose of qualified immunity — to balance the competing need to hold public officials accountable... and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability. To the contrary, it exonerates officers for obviously unlawful conduct, so long as that particular conduct is so extreme and unprecedented that it is not contemplated by policy and has never been attempted before.”<sup>45</sup> This reasoning creates a doctrinal framework for challenging the Porterville deployment: conduct that is “so extreme and unprecedented” that no policy addresses it should not be insulated from liability merely because it has never been attempted before.

#### 2.2.4 The “Obvious Case” Exception — *Hope v. Pelzer*

In *Hope v. Pelzer*, 536 U.S. 730 (2002), the Supreme Court held that officials “can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances” where the constitutional violation is “obvious”<sup>45</sup>. The Court explained that a “general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though the very action in question has not previously been held unlawful.”<sup>46</sup> The application here is direct. The general constitutional rule that deadly force cannot be used against contained suspects posing no imminent threat is “already identified in the decisional law” through *Tennessee v. Garner* and its progeny. Using a 16-ton armored vehicle to strike a contained suspect is an application of that general rule with “obvious clarity.” As the *Sabbe* majority acknowledged, “a reasonable jury could find” the armored vehicle collision was excessive force.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>45</sup> [Bookmark not defined.](#)

The qualified immunity analysis proceeds in two steps: (1) whether the officer violated a constitutional right, and (2) whether that right was “clearly established” at the time of the violation<sup>46</sup>. An officer is entitled to immunity unless the constitutional violation was clearly established such that “every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right”<sup>47</sup>. The Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished lower courts not to define clearly established law “at a high level of generality”<sup>48</sup>. Under *Hope*, however, the general rule from *Garner* — that deadly force against a contained suspect is

---

<sup>45</sup> Southern Poverty Law Center. <https://www.splcenter.org/resources/civil-rights-case-docket/hope-v-pelzer/>

<sup>46</sup> Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law. <https://jaapl.org/content/47/4/527>

<sup>47</sup> NAPD. <https://publicdefenders.us/blogs/kisela-v-hughes-courts-must-not-define-qclear-establishedq-law-with-high-level-of-generality-in-deciding-if-police-have-qualified-immunity/>

<sup>48</sup> Columbia Law Review. <https://www.columbialawreview.org/content/qualified-immunity-formalism-clearly-established-law-and-the-right-to-record-police-activity/>

unconstitutional — may provide sufficient clarity even without precisely on-point precedent because the violation is “obvious” in the specific context.

### 2.2.5 Substantive Due Process — “Shocks the Conscience”

**County of Sacramento v. Lewis**, 523 U.S. 833 (1998), established that executive action “shocking to the conscience” violates substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment<sup>49</sup>. The test requires more than negligence but does not require intent to harm — deliberate indifference to survival suffices in certain contexts<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>.

For the Porterville deployment, the “shocks the conscience” analysis centers on three elements. The **method of engagement** — deploying an armored vehicle designed for ballistic protection as an offensive weapon against a contained suspect — has no precedent in American law enforcement tactical doctrine. The **availability of alternatives** — chemical agents, negotiation, containment, and time — were all on the officers’ side during a standoff lasting multiple hours. And the **decision-making process** — a multi-hour operation providing ample time for deliberate tactical planning — removes the “split-second judgment” deference that courts typically afford officers in rapidly evolving confrontations<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>.

The Ninth Circuit’s analysis in *Sabbe*, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in *Hope*, and the “shocks the conscience” framework from *Lewis* converge on a single conclusion: no reasonable officer could believe that driving an armored vehicle over a contained suspect during a multi-hour standoff satisfies constitutional standards.

## 2.3 Municipal Liability Under *Monell*

### 2.3.1 Sheriffs’ Statements as Organizational Policy

**Monell v. Department of Social Services**, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), holds that municipalities can be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional violations caused by “official policy, custom, or practice”<sup>50</sup>. A municipality is not liable under a theory of respondeat superior; the plaintiff must prove that a policy or custom of the municipality caused the constitutional violation<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. Three pathways to *Monell* liability exist: (1) an officially adopted policy statement, ordinance, or regulation; (2) a persistent, widespread custom with the force of law; or (3) failure to train or supervise amounting to deliberate indifference.

Under **Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati**, 475 U.S. 469 (1986), a single decision by a municipal policymaker with final authority can create *Monell* liability. Elected sheriffs are final policymakers for their agencies. Sheriff Youngblood’s statements constitute official policy evidence on multiple fronts.

Youngblood’s declaration that “all bets are off” once deadly force is authorized removes proportionality and necessity constraints — the core limitations that *Graham* imposes on

---

<sup>49</sup> eRepository @ Seton Hall. [https://scholarship.shu.edu/con\\_law/vol10/iss3/20/](https://scholarship.shu.edu/con_law/vol10/iss3/20/)

<sup>50</sup> The Zeiger Firm. <https://brianzeiger.com/philadelphia-police-brutality-lawyer/monell-claim/>

all use-of-force decisions. His statement that “the same concept” of deadly force “applies to the BearCat” equates an armored rescue vehicle with an officer discharging a firearm in self-defense, collapsing the distinction between defensive deadly force and offensive vehicular assault<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>.

Boudreaux’s statement — “We intentionally ran him over. Don’t shoot at cops. You shoot at cops, we’re gonna run you over” — operates as custom evidence under *Monell*<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. A “custom” need not be formally adopted; it can be established through a persistent, widespread practice that the municipality’s policymaking officials tolerate or acquiesce to. Boudreaux’s framing of the action as a general principle applicable to any suspect who “shoots at cops” — removing any case-by-case assessment of necessity or proportionality — demonstrates a custom of responding to violence against officers with maximum force regardless of constitutional constraints.

Together, both sheriffs’ statements transform what might be characterized as an isolated tactical decision into evidence of a broader policy or custom. They articulate a principle for using armored vehicles as offensive weapons against suspects who have engaged in violence against officers — a category of force authorization that, if accepted as policy, would substantially broaden the circumstances in which deadly force is constitutionally permissible beyond anything the Supreme Court has recognized.

### [2.3.2 Pattern Evidence: The \\$30.5M Lewis Verdict](#)

The *Monell* claim is substantially strengthened by pattern evidence. In March 2025, a federal jury awarded \$30.5 million to the family of Mickel Lewis Sr., an unarmed man killed by a KCSO deputy — one of the largest police shooting verdicts in California history<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. The verdict was particularly significant because KCSO’s internal review had found the shooting “within policy” before the federal jury disagreed<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. That internal finding — that killing an unarmed man comported with departmental policy — demonstrates the same pattern of force authorization that the sheriffs’ Porterville statements reveal.

The broader settlement history compounds this pattern. KCSO and the Bakersfield Police Department have paid more than \$57.8 million in settlements and verdicts for civil rights violations, including \$8.8 million for the killing of Daniel Hiler and Chrystal Jolley, \$6 million for the beating death of James Moore in custody, and \$3.4 million for the death of David Sal Silva<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. The Guardian’s 2015 investigation found that KCSO had the highest per-capita rate of police killings in the United States — 1.5 people per 100,000 residents, compared to New York City’s rate with ten times the population. All 54 fatal shootings in the decade prior were ruled justified by internal panels<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>.

This pattern — internal exoneration followed by massive civil liability — satisfies *Monell*’s requirement for a “persistent, widespread practice” that is “so permanent and well settled as to constitute a ‘custom or usage’ with the force of law.”

### 2.3.3 Deliberate Indifference: Five Years of Non-Compliance

The failure-to-train pathway under *Monell* requires proof of “deliberate indifference” to constitutional rights. In the Porterville context, the evidence is substantial.

KCSO has operated under a court-approved stipulated judgment with the California Department of Justice since December 2020<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. The judgment was extended for two additional years in February 2026 — seven weeks before the Porterville incident — because KCSO “failed to achieve substantial compliance with the required reforms”<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. The judgment covers eight reform areas: Use of Force Policy, Canine Policy, Searches and Seizures, Supervisor Oversight, Community Policing, Transparency and Accountability, Enhanced Community Relations, and Equitable Treatment<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>.

The stipulated judgment contains **zero provisions** addressing armored vehicle deployment protocols, armored vehicle use as a force option, training requirements for BearCat operators, authorization levels for armored vehicle offensive deployment, or restrictions on using armored vehicles as weapons<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. This is not a drafting oversight — it is a structural limitation that KCSO exploited. Comparative analysis confirms that no major consent decree (Minneapolis, Chicago, New Orleans) currently contains specific armored vehicle provisions<sup>51 52</sup>, reflecting the relative novelty of using armored vehicles as offensive weapons rather than rescue platforms.

However, other agencies have addressed this gap proactively. Sacramento Police Department General Order 580.18 restricts armored vehicles to “ballistic protection, rescue platforms, removal of fortifications, breaching, and other unspecified emergency situations where preservation of life is paramount” — explicitly prohibiting crowd control, homeless encampment cleanup, and routine patrol<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. The National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) Tactical Response and Operations Standard lists “use of armored rescue vehicle and other specialized vehicles” as a required competency for barricaded subject operations<sup>53</sup>. And U.S. Customs and Border Protection classifies intentional vehicle-to-vehicle impact techniques as either less-lethal or deadly force depending on risk factors, mandating supervisor authorization, certified training, and documentation<sup>54</sup>.

KCSO had access to all of these models. The fact that it operated multiple BearCat vehicles — each costing an estimated \$400{,}000 or more<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> — without adopting comparable constitutional limitations on their offensive use, while under federal oversight for pattern-and-practice excessive force, constitutes deliberate indifference. The NTOA standards require annual policy review including “implications of national and jurisdictional rulings and precedents on current training, operations and policy”<sup>55</sup>. Had

---

<sup>51</sup> Best Best & Krieger. <https://bbklaw.com/resources/local-campaign-finance-reform-what-local-agencies-can-and-cannot-do-part-2>

<sup>52</sup> City of Chicago. [https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/cpb/supp\\_info/ConsentDecreeComplete.pdf](https://www.chicago.gov/content/dam/city/depts/cpb/supp_info/ConsentDecreeComplete.pdf)

<sup>53</sup> NTOA. <https://ntoa.org/pdf/swatstandards.pdf>

<sup>54</sup> U.S. Customs and Border Protection. [https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2024-09/exhibit\\_09\\_-\\_cbp\\_use\\_of\\_force\\_policy\\_final\\_jan\\_2021.pdf](https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/2024-09/exhibit_09_-_cbp_use_of_force_policy_final_jan_2021.pdf)

<sup>55</sup> Legal Defense Fund. <https://naacpldf.org/police-pattern-practice-investigation/>

KCSO conducted such review, it would have encountered *Sabbe v. Washington County* — decided just three years before the Porterville incident — and the constitutional limits on armored vehicle offensive deployment would have been “clearly established” within the agency.

The Porterville killing thus represents not merely an isolated constitutional violation but the predictable consequence of a systemic failure: an agency under federal oversight for excessive force expanded its tactical capabilities into an unregulated domain, deployed those capabilities in a manner that existing precedent suggests was unconstitutional, and then had its elected leader publicly defend the deployment as consistent with departmental policy. Under *Monell*, *Pembaur*, and *Graham*, that sequence creates municipal liability that no qualified immunity defense can shield.

The ultimate legal question — whether any reasonable officer would believe the BearCat deployment lawful — is one that a jury should decide. Under *Graham*, the reasonableness inquiry “is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application” but “requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case”<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> Those facts and circumstances, viewed from the perspective of officers inside a ballistic-protected vehicle against a contained suspect during a multi-hour standoff, present a strong case that the deployment fell outside the range of constitutionally reasonable force. And the sheriffs’ own statements provide the roadmap for proving that the constitutional violation was caused by official policy — the precise element that transforms individual misconduct into municipal liability under § 1983.

---

### 3. The Financial Web: Pension Funds Meet Private Equity

The constitutional violations documented in Chapter 2 did not occur in a fiscal vacuum. Every KCSO operation — from helicopter patrols to armored vehicle deployments — is funded through a budgetary process that intersects, in ways the public cannot fully see, with the retirement investments of the very county employees who staff the Sheriff’s Office. This chapter maps that intersection: a circular financial flow connecting Kern County taxpayers, the Kern County Employees’ Retirement Association (KCERA), private equity firm AE Industrial Partners, and the aerospace companies that supply KCSO’s aviation unit. The circuit is not accidental. It is structured, lucrative, and — under current California law — almost entirely opaque.

#### 3.1 KCERA and AE Industrial Partners

##### 3.1.1 The \$35 Million Commitment

On May 18, 2018, the Kern County Employees’ Retirement Association (KCERA) committed **\$35 million** to AE Industrial Partners Fund II, a private equity buyout fund focused on aerospace, defense, and industrial services. The commitment carries a 10-year term through May 18, 2028.<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> The fund itself raised \$1.36 billion in total capital, with KCERA joining multiple California public pension systems as limited partners.<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> This investment places Kern County in a financial relationship with a

private equity firm whose portfolio companies operate in the same aerospace sector that supplies KCSO's aviation fleet. KCERA's own documents characterize the commitment as part of an 18% target allocation to Private Markets, with 5% specifically directed to Private Equity — representing approximately \$345 million of KCERA's \$6.9 billion in assets under management. **Error! Bookmark not defined.** The commitment was not a one-off allocation. In 2024, KCERA earmarked an additional **\$70 million** for buyout and distressed debt funds, including a Castlelake fund specifically targeting aerospace and defense sectors. **Error! Bookmark not defined.** These parallel investments suggest KCERA has adopted a sector-concentrated strategy in aerospace and defense private equity — the same sector that benefits every time KCSO expands its aviation capabilities.

### *3.1.2 AE Industrial Partners: The Aerospace Consolidator*

AE Industrial Partners, headquartered in Boca Raton, Florida, manages approximately **\$9.2 billion in assets under management** and has completed more than 155 investments since 2015. **Error! Bookmark not defined.** The firm was founded in 1998 as AeroEquity Partners, Inc., rebranding to AE Industrial Partners in 2015 to reflect expansion beyond pure aerospace into power, utility, and national security markets. The historical name persists in the firm's domain name — [aeroequity.com](http://aeroequity.com) — and in the aircraft leasing operations still conducted under the AeroEquity brand.

The firm's portfolio includes multiple companies directly relevant to law enforcement aviation procurement. Columbia Helicopters, acquired in August 2019, is a global heavy-lift operator with **over \$1.7 billion in cumulative U.S. federal government contracts**, including a \$33.5 million firm-fixed-price contract for CH-47 maintenance and overhaul awarded by Army Contracting Command in August 2023. <sup>56</sup>Alpine Air, acquired in May 2019, provides regional air cargo and charter services. Yingling Aviation, acquired in May 2023, offers maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) services. Applied Composites, held since May 2016, manufactures aerospace composite components. **Error! Bookmark not defined.** These companies do not merely operate in the same sector as KCSO's suppliers — they are potential suppliers. Columbia Helicopters maintains Department of Defense Commercial Airlift Review Board certification and provides exactly the class of heavy-lift and MRO services that law enforcement aviation units require. Yingling Aviation's MRO capabilities could theoretically service the Airbus H125 fleet KCSO purchased in 2022.

### *3.1.3 The Statewide Pattern: LACERA's \$350 Million Vote of Confidence*

KCERA's \$35 million commitment is not an isolated decision by a single county pension fund. In February 2026, the Los Angeles County Employees' Retirement Association (LACERA) approved a **\$350 million commitment to AE Industrial Partners IV, L.P.** — ten times KCERA's Fund II commitment and one of the largest known public pension investments in AE Industrial to date. **Error! Bookmark not defined.** LACERA's Chief Investment Officer approved the commitment under delegated authority, describing the fund as focusing on "investments in the industrials and materials sectors primarily in North America." **Error! Bookmark not defined.** This pattern confirms that AE Industrial Partners has

---

<sup>56</sup> The Fresno Bee. <https://www.fresnobee.com/news/local/article315406730.html>

positioned itself as a **preferred private equity partner for California county pension systems**. Contra Costa County Employees’ Retirement Association (CCCERA) also committed \$35 million to AE Industrial Fund II on the same timeline as KCERA, suggesting coordinated marketing by the firm to California public pension funds.<sup>57</sup>The implications extend beyond any single county: California’s public pension systems collectively manage over \$800 billion in assets, and even modest allocations to aerospace-focused private equity create concentrated public capital flows into a sector that sells surveillance and military equipment back to the same counties’ law enforcement agencies.

Notably, KCERA and LACERA share the same fiduciary counsel firm — Nossaman LLP — with the same attorney providing fiduciary services to both pension systems.<sup>58</sup>This shared advisory relationship raises questions about whether investment recommendations echo across county lines, creating an echo-chamber effect that concentrates capital in the same PE funds without independent due diligence.

### 3.2 The Circular Money Flow

#### 3.2.1 The Complete Financial Circuit

The financial circuit operates as a closed loop. County taxpayers contribute to KCERA through employee deductions and employer matching. KCERA invests those contributions in private equity funds including AE Industrial Partners. AE Industrial owns aerospace and defense portfolio companies. Those companies benefit from a thriving law enforcement aviation market — including purchases by KCSO, funded by county budget appropriations approved by the same Board of Supervisors that oversees KCERA. The circuit completes when county taxpayers, through their general fund contributions, finance the very aviation procurement that supports the sector in which their pension fund is invested.

**Table 1: The Complete Financial Circuit — Kern County**

Stage	Source	Destination	Mechanism	Dollar Amount
1	County taxpayer s	KCERA	Employee contributions + employer matching	\$6.9B AUM <small>Error! Bookmark not defined.</small>
2	KCERA	AE Industrial Partners Fund II	Private equity commitment	\$35.0M <small>Error! Bookmark not defined.</small>
3	AE Industrial	Columbia Helicopters, Alpine Air, Yingling Aviation	Portfolio acquisition & management	\$1.36B fund size <small>Error! Bookmark not defined.</small>

<sup>57</sup> KCERA. [https://www.kcera.org/files/a6998cca1/25-08-13+BOR+Agenda\\_web.pdf](https://www.kcera.org/files/a6998cca1/25-08-13+BOR+Agenda_web.pdf)

<sup>58</sup> Electronic Frontier Foundation. <https://www EFF.org/deeplinks/2024/10/california-attorney-general-issues-new-guidance-military-equipment-law-enforcement>


Stage	Source	Destination	Mechanism	Dollar Amount
4	Aerospace sector	KCSO Aviation Unit	Aircraft & equipment procurement	\$12.0M (H125s) Error! Bookmark not defined.
5	KCSO	County General Fund	Budget appropriations & operating costs	Ongoing <sup>59</sup>
6	County General Fund	County taxpayers	Tax levy & revenue collection	Circular return

The circularity is not merely theoretical. Each stage is documented. On April 26, 2022, the Kern County Board of Supervisors approved Item No. 68: “the Kern County Sheriff’s Office request to purchase the outfitting of two Airbus H125 Helicopters.” Error! Bookmark not defined. The helicopters, tail numbers N912KC and N913KC, were delivered in late 2023 at a total cost of approximately **\$12 million**, replacing aging MD-500E airframes. KCSO Air Support Commander Joel Swanson acknowledged the timing: “We were also in a good budget year and basically, the stars all aligned.” Error! Bookmark not defined. FAA registration records confirm N913KC is registered to the Kern County Sheriff’s Office as a government

---

<sup>59</sup> KCERA. [https://www.kcera.org/files/0235adc3c/25-09-10+BOR+Agenda\\_web.pdf](https://www.kcera.org/files/0235adc3c/25-09-10+BOR+Agenda_web.pdf)

aircraft, manufactured in 2023 by Airbus Helicopters Inc. <sup>60</sup>



The diagram above illustrates the complete circuit. What it cannot illustrate — because the information is legally shielded — is whether AE Industrial Fund II’s portfolio companies have any direct or indirect business relationships with Airbus, with KCSO maintenance contractors, or with any other Kern County aviation vendor. That information falls within the scope of California Government Code § 7928.710, which categorically exempts such disclosures from public view.

### 3.2.2 The Disclosure Shield: California Government Code § 7928.710

The practical effect of the circular money flow cannot be fully assessed because the documentary evidence is, by legislative design, hidden. California Government Code § 7928.710 (formerly § 6254.26, enacted via SB 439 in 2005) exempts from public disclosure a sweeping range of records related to public pension funds’ alternative investments. **Error! Bookmark not defined.** The statute specifically shields: due diligence materials; quarterly and annual financial statements; meeting materials; records containing portfolio position information; capital call and distribution notices; and all alternative investment agreements and related documents. **Error! Bookmark not defined.** What must be disclosed under the statute is minimal: the name, address, and vintage year of each alternative investment vehicle; the dollar amount of commitment; cash contributions made; cash distributions received; and aggregate investment multiples and net IRR. Everything else — including

<sup>60</sup> Commission on POST. <https://post.ca.gov/Peace-Officer-Certification-Actions>

whether KCERA's investment consultant analyzed potential conflicts of interest between AE Industrial's portfolio and KCSO procurement — is exempt.

KCERA board agendas routinely invoke this exemption. A standard September 2024 Investment Committee Summary notes: "Written materials and investment recommendations from the consultants, fund managers and KCERA investment staff relating to alternative investments are exempt from public disclosure pursuant to California Government Code § 7928.710, § 7922.000, and § 54957.5." <sup>61</sup>The exemption applies not merely to proprietary trading strategies but to basic governance questions: Was any conflict-of-interest analysis performed before KCERA committed \$35 million to AE Industrial? What fees does KCERA pay the firm? Which specific portfolio companies has Fund II invested in? Under current law, the public has no right to know.

The original 2005 legislation justified this exemption with legislative findings stating that while "the public has a paramount interest in knowing how public money is spent and invested," confidentiality is "essential to the success" of alternative investments, and disclosure "could be harmful to generating sustainable and profitable rates of return." <sup>62</sup>The legislature further found that exclusion from private equity investments would "impose substantial costs on state public pension funds." <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> Whether those findings remain valid two decades later — as California public pension funds have poured billions into private equity while the state's law enforcement agencies have simultaneously expanded their aviation and surveillance procurement — is a question the legislature has only recently begun to revisit.

### *3.2.3 Senate Bill 1319: The Private Equity Sunshine Act*

In April 2026, Senator Dave Cortese introduced **Senate Bill 1319**, the "Private Equity Sunshine Act," which would significantly expand disclosure requirements for California public pension funds' alternative investments. <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> The bill would require disclosure of detailed performance data for alternative investments compared to equivalent public market benchmarks, underlying assets, their geographic locations, and workforce data tied to those investments. <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> SB 1319 is supported by State Treasurer Fiona Ma, the California Federation of Labor Unions, UFCW Western States Council, UNITE HERE Local 11, and UAW Region 6. <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> Its passage would pierce the disclosure shield that has protected KCERA's AE Industrial investment from public scrutiny for eight years. For pension fund trustees and legislative investigators, SB 1319 represents the most significant challenge to California's private equity opacity regime since the original 2005 exemption was enacted.

## **3.3 Conflict of Interest Analysis**

### *3.3.1 The Dual Role: Board Members as Investment and Procurement Gatekeepers*

The structural conflict in Kern County's governance model is straightforward: the **same five-member Board of Supervisors** that approves KCERA's investment policy and

---

<sup>61</sup> American Friends Service Committee. <https://afsc.org/california-ab481-advocacy-toolkit-annual-reports>

<sup>62</sup> UC San Diego Police Department. <https://police.ucsd.edu/about/ab-481.html>

alternative investment commitments also approves the KCSO budget that funds aviation procurement. No firewall separates these decisions. When the Board approved the \$12 million H125 purchase on April 26, 2022, it did so in the same capacity — as county governing body — that oversees KCERA’s \$6.9 billion portfolio, including its \$35 million commitment to AE Industrial Partners Fund II.

This dual role creates at least three categories of potential conflict. First, an **investment-procurement conflict**: KCERA’s pension returns depend partly on AE Industrial Partners’ success; AE Industrial’s success depends partly on aerospace and defense company performance; those companies benefit from a thriving law enforcement aviation market; and KCSO purchases aviation equipment using county funds. If KCSO procurement decisions expand the aerospace sector’s revenue, KCERA’s pension returns could theoretically benefit — creating an incentive for Board members to prioritize aviation spending over other public safety needs.

Second, an **information asymmetry conflict**: AE Industrial Partners has detailed knowledge of KCERA’s investment strategy, constraints, and timeline. The firm’s portfolio companies operate in the same aviation ecosystem as KCSO. This creates potential for preferential information flow about KCSO fleet modernization plans that could advantage AE Industrial’s portfolio companies in competitive bidding for aviation contracts statewide.

Third, a **sector concentration risk**: KCERA’s private equity allocation includes aerospace and defense exposure through multiple funds — not merely AE Industrial but also the Castletlake fund to which KCERA directed part of its \$70 million 2024 buyout allocation. Error! Bookmark not defined. An economic downturn affecting aerospace would simultaneously depress KCERA’s PE returns and increase KCSO’s equipment costs, concentrating fiscal risk in a single sector.

### *3.3.2 The \$12 Million Helicopter Purchase and the Aerospace Sector*

The KCSO’s \$12 million Airbus H125 purchase directly benefits the aerospace sector in which county pension funds are invested. While there is no publicly available evidence that AE Industrial portfolio companies were involved in the H125 transaction — Airbus Helicopters Inc. is not an AE Industrial holding — the purchase contributes to the overall market demand that sustains the sector’s valuations. AE Industrial’s Columbia Helicopters competes in the same helicopter services market; Yingling Aviation provides MRO services for the same aircraft class; and the sector’s growth depends in part on law enforcement aviation expansion.

The purchase was also strategically timed. Approved in April 2022 and delivered in late 2023, the H125 acquisition occurred during the same period that KCERA’s \$35 million AE Industrial Fund II commitment was generating returns — or losses — that the public cannot see due to § 7928.710’s disclosure shield. The 10-year fund term, expiring May 2028, overlaps almost precisely with the helicopters’ service entry, creating a temporal convergence in which both the pension investment and the procurement decision will be evaluated for performance around the same date.

### 3.3.3 Vincent Kolber and the RESIDCO Political Network

The financial web extends beyond AE Industrial Partners to encompass another aerospace asset manager with documented Kern County operations. **Vincent A. Kolber**, founder and chairman of Chicago-based RESIDCO, has made substantial documented political contributions that raise questions about the intersection of aviation finance and political influence.

**Table 2: California Pension Fund Commitments to AE Industrial Partners — Statewide Pattern**

Pension Fund	Commitment	Fund	Date	County Population
LACERA	\$350.0M	AE Industrial Partners IV	Feb 2026 <small>Error! Bookmark not defined.</small>	9.8M
KCERA	\$35.0M	AE Industrial Partners Fund II	May 2018 <small>Error! Bookmark not defined.</small>	0.9M
CCCERA	\$35.0M	AE Industrial Partners Fund II	May 2018 <small>Error! Bookmark not defined.</small>	1.1M
<b>Total (Documented)</b>	<b>\$420.0M</b>	—	—	—

Kolber donated **\$100,000** to Illinois gubernatorial candidate Ted Dabrowski in December 2025, according to Politico Illinois Playbook.<sup>63</sup> In March 2026, Illinois State Board of Elections filings show Kolber contributed \$14,600 personally and an additional \$10,400 through Residual Based Finance Corp to the Voter Protection NFP PAC.<sup>64</sup> Federal contribution records document \$5,000 to the Mark Calonder campaign in June 2018 and \$2,699 to Ted Cruz’s presidential campaign in July 2016. Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined. These contributions, totaling more than **\$127,000** in documented donations, come from the founder of a firm that controls ALF IX LLC — a shell company operating **73 aircraft** with documented presence at Meadows Field in Bakersfield, the same airport serving as KCSO aviation unit’s operational base. Error! Bookmark not defined. While no direct evidence links Kolber’s political spending to Kern County decisions, the concentration of aviation finance activity — KCERA’s pension investments, KCSO’s helicopter purchases, RESIDCO’s aircraft operations, and Kolber’s political contributions — within a single sector and geographic region creates an environment where sectoral interests may systematically outweigh public oversight.

The statewide pattern documented in Table 2 compounds these concerns. When LACERA committed \$350 million to AE Industrial Partners IV in February 2026, it did so knowing that AE Industrial’s portfolio — including Columbia Helicopters with its \$1.7 billion in federal contracts — operates in a sector that depends on continued government aviation

<sup>63</sup> KCERA. [https://www.kcera.org/files/c306afae6/26-02-11+BOR+Agenda\\_web.pdf](https://www.kcera.org/files/c306afae6/26-02-11+BOR+Agenda_web.pdf)

<sup>64</sup> California Legislative Information.

[https://leginfo.ca.gov/faces/codes\\_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=GOV&sectionNum=7928.710](https://leginfo.ca.gov/faces/codes_displaySection.xhtml?lawCode=GOV&sectionNum=7928.710)

spending at the county, state, and federal levels. The \$420 million in documented California pension commitments to AE Industrial funds represents not a diversified public investment but a concentrated directional bet on the aerospace and defense sector — a sector that sells equipment back to the very government agencies whose employees' retirements depend on the fund's performance.

The structural question this chapter poses is not whether any individual has committed a provable conflict-of-interest violation. Under California's current disclosure regime, the evidence necessary to prove such a violation is categorically exempt from public view. The question is whether a system that permits the same governing body to simultaneously invest public employee retirement funds in private equity and approve law enforcement procurement from the same sector — while shielding both sets of decisions from public scrutiny — can produce accountable governance. The evidence suggests it cannot. Senate Bill 1319, if enacted, would begin to pierce that opacity. Until then, the circular money flow remains legally invisible — and structurally self-reinforcing.

---

## 4. The Surveillance Network: Shell Companies in the Sky

On any given afternoon above Bakersfield, California, a Cessna 172S Skyhawk may circle a residential neighborhood at 944 feet — nearly 60 percent below the FAA's minimum safe altitude for congested areas. The aircraft, tail number N786FA, is registered to ALF IX LLC, a Delaware limited liability company controlled by Chicago-based RESIDCO, a transportation asset manager with more than \$2 billion under management. <sup>65</sup>N786FA has accumulated 1,503 documented altitude violations. Its minimum recorded altitude: zero feet. A fixed-wing aircraft cannot fly at zero feet. A Cessna 172S cannot hover at one knot airspeed. These readings are physically impossible — and they are not isolated anomalies. The Watchtower database documents 47 such zero-altitude violations across the Kern County surveillance network, alongside 1,365,336 detections below 1,000 feet and 118,773 total altitude violations. <sup>65</sup>These numbers describe not random pilot error but a coordinated aerial surveillance apparatus operating through shell companies, spoofed transponders, and medical aircraft flying under false identities.

This chapter maps that apparatus: the corporate architecture that owns it, the regulatory gaps that enable it, and the flight data that proves it exists.

### 4.1 ALF IX LLC and the RESIDCO Network

#### 4.1.1 A Delaware Shell with a 73-Aircraft Fleet

ALF IX LLC exists on paper in Wilmington, Delaware. It operates from 70 West Madison Street, Suite 2200, in Chicago's Loop district — the headquarters of RESIDCO. FAA registry records confirm that ALF IX LLC holds registration for at least 73 aircraft, ranking it as the 82nd largest fleet in the United States.

---

<sup>65</sup> youtube.com. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=27bc9TcGGtg>

fleet consists overwhelmingly of Cessna 172S Skyhawks, Piper PA-44-180 Seminoles, and Diamond DA 42 NG twins — small, piston-powered aircraft with purchase prices well below turbine helicopters but with endurance and loitering capabilities that make them ideal for persistent aerial observation.

Within Kern County, at least eight ALF IX aircraft operate with sequential tail numbers: N786FA through N791FA. FAA records show these aircraft were registered on June 9, 2024, with sequential manufacturer serial numbers (172S13163, 172S13164, 172S13166, 172S13167, 172S13169). **Error! Bookmark not defined.** Batch acquisition with sequential serial numbers is consistent with fleet purchasing for coordinated operations, not independent private ownership. No flight school, individual hobbyist, or conventional leasing customer buys eight identical aircraft with consecutive serial numbers on the same day.

RESIDCO, the controlling entity, describes itself as a transportation asset management firm investing in “commercial and corporate aircraft, engines, and components” with “leasing and financial solutions for customers worldwide.” **Error! Bookmark not defined.** In January 2026, RESIDCO closed a \$100 million commercial aircraft engine acquisition facility with Huntington National Bank, signaling continued expansion in aviation assets. **Error! Bookmark not defined.** The firm was founded by Vincent A. Kolber, who holds an MBA from the University of Chicago and a BS from Wharton. <sup>66</sup>Kolber is not merely a financier. He is a political actor. In December 2025, Politico’s Illinois Playbook reported that Kolber donated \$100,000 to Ted Dabrowski’s Illinois gubernatorial campaign, placing him among the state’s “business-class donor community — defined by its wealth, pragmatism and preference for policy-focused politics.” **Error! Bookmark not defined.** In 2022, Kolber created a political action committee called “Crime and Tax Eliminators” and contributed \$151,000 to support Republican Bob Fioretti’s campaign for Cook County Board President. <sup>67</sup>Illinois State Board of Elections filings show Kolber contributed an additional \$25,000 in March 2026 to the “Voter Protection NFP Political Action Committee” — \$14,600 personally and \$10,400 from RESIDCO’s corporate entity, Residual Based Finance Corp. <sup>68</sup>Kolber also ran as the Republican candidate for Illinois’s 5th Congressional District in 2014 and 2016. **Error! Bookmark not defined.** The man whose company controls 73 aircraft surveilling Kern County residents has spent more than \$276,000 on Republican political campaigns and PACs in recent cycles alone.

#### *4.1.2 Persistent Low-Altitude Operations Over Populated Areas*

The ALF IX fleet in Kern County does not conduct routine flight training or charter operations. Watchtower database records show sustained low-altitude flight patterns inconsistent with any legitimate aviation purpose. N786FA averaged 944 feet across all detections — in airspace where 14 CFR 91.119 requires 1,000 feet above the highest obstacle within a 2,000-foot radius over congested areas. <sup>69</sup>N791FA, designated

---

<sup>66</sup> Markets Group. <https://www.marketsgroup.org/news/kcera-boosts-private-markets-allocations-amid-strong-market-start>

<sup>67</sup> KCERA. [https://www.kcera.org/files/e13d6822c/25-10-08+BOR+Agenda\\_web.pdf](https://www.kcera.org/files/e13d6822c/25-10-08+BOR+Agenda_web.pdf)

<sup>68</sup> KGET.com. <https://www.kget.com/news/local-news/kern-county-sheriff-donny-youngblood-to-hold-press-conference-on-porterville-shooting/>

<sup>69</sup> Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press. <https://www.rcfp.org/open-government-guide/california/>

“Aggressor” in the database, averaged 852 feet with 1,307 violations. Error! Bookmark not defined.N787FA accumulated 959 violations at an average altitude of 967 feet. N790FA logged 1,051 violations with an average altitude of 1,121 feet. Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined.These are not occasional deviations. They are systematic, sustained violations of federal aviation safety regulations conducted by aircraft registered to a Delaware shell company controlled by a Chicago-based political donor’s \$2 billion asset management firm.

On November 20, 2025, the database recorded concentrated multi-aircraft targeting: N790FA made 38 passes in a single day, achieving a severity score of 100.0. Multiple ALF IX aircraft appeared within the same 24-hour window, a pattern the database flags as indicative of “sustained surveillance operation.” Error! Bookmark not defined.#### 4.1.3 The Transponder Spoofing Evidence

The most technically significant anomaly involves N786FA’s transponder. FAA registry records list the aircraft’s Mode S code (hexadecimal) as AAA74E. Error! Bookmark not defined.However, cross-referenced ADS-B tracking data and contextual documents indicate the aircraft has broadcast under a different Mode S code: 32171FC. Error! Bookmark not defined.The manufacturer’s serial number — 172S13163 — matches across both records, confirming these codes refer to the same physical aircraft. A single aircraft with two different ICAO 24-bit addresses is a transponder discrepancy that raises immediate red flags for ADS-B spoofing.

The ICAO 24-bit address is supposed to be a unique, immutable identifier — the aviation equivalent of a vehicle identification number. When an aircraft broadcasts a code that differs from its FAA-registered identifier, it can mean one of three things: the transponder was misprogrammed, the aircraft’s ADS-B unit was intentionally modified, or someone is conducting a spoofing attack. Aviation cybersecurity research published by ICAO’s Asia-Pacific Office documents multiple spoofing techniques including “ghost aircraft injection,” where a ground-based attacker uses software-defined radio to introduce ghost planes into airspace, and “aircraft-based spoofing,” where a transponder’s ICAO address is modified to masquerade as another aircraft. Error! Bookmark not defined.Academic research has demonstrated successful detection of such attacks with 99.34 percent accuracy using deep neural network analysis. Error! Bookmark not defined.The regulatory context matters. Under 14 CFR 91.225(f)(1), the FAA permits aircraft performing “sensitive government mission for national defense, homeland security, intelligence or law enforcement purposes” to disable or modify ADS-B transmission. Error! Bookmark not defined.This exemption creates a legal pathway for law enforcement aircraft to operate with non-standard transponder signatures — but it also provides cover for private aircraft conducting surveillance on behalf of law enforcement entities. Whether N786FA’s dual-code status results from authorized government modification or unauthorized private spoofing is a question that demands FAA investigation. What is not in doubt is that the discrepancy exists and that it affects an aircraft conducting persistent low-altitude surveillance over American neighborhoods.

Aviation forums have documented real-world cases of hex code theft. In a 2018 thread on Vans Air Force, an aircraft owner described receiving FlightAware alerts that his plane was

flying over North Carolina while it sat in its hangar — caused by another operator incorrectly programming a transponder with the owner’s hex code.<sup>70</sup>The phenomenon is known and reproducible. What distinguishes the N786FA case is the scale of the surrounding operation: not one stolen code, but a fleet of 73 aircraft registered to a shell company, conducting thousands of violations, with the same aircraft broadcasting under two different identities.

## 4.2 Medical Aircraft Identity Masking

### 4.2.1 N743AM: When a Sheriff Helicopter Wears a Medevac Badge

On February 14, 2026, database analysts documented aircraft N743AM — radar-listed as an Air Methods / SkyLife Mercy Air medical helicopter — operating in patterns inconsistent with emergency medical transport. Visual ground observers confirmed what radar could not: N743AM was a Kern County Sheriff helicopter, not a medical aircraft. **Error! Bookmark not defined.** The KCSO aviation unit profile identifies this as “the first formally logged case of identity masking” and alleges the aircraft conducts “dual-purpose operations” combining “legitimate healthcare with covert biometric surveillance.” **Error! Bookmark not defined.** The implications extend beyond deception. FAA regulations grant medevac flights special air traffic control priority for genuine emergencies. An aircraft wearing medical markings while conducting law enforcement surveillance exploits that priority to gain airspace access it would not otherwise receive. The KCSO profile describes this practice as one that “weaponizes public safety authority” and notes that “using a hospital-wing paint job as camouflage is an established defense mechanism by the operators.” **Error! Bookmark not defined.**#### 4.2.2 9K Air LLC: The KCSO-Aligned Operator

9K Air LLC operates a fleet of MD 500E helicopters including N916GW and N916BQ. The Tactical Analysis Report classifies 9K Air as a “KCSO-affiliated operator” engaged in “direct coordination with law enforcement aviation.”<sup>71</sup>N916GW accumulated 2,012 detections, of which 69.7 percent occurred below 3,000 feet, and racked up 1,095 altitude violations with a minimum recorded altitude of zero feet.<sup>72</sup>N916BQ logged 1,020 violations, also with a zero-foot minimum. **Error! Bookmark not defined.** While MD 500E helicopters can hover, zero-foot altitude readings during forward flight remain anomalous. These aircraft serve as an intermediary operational layer between KCSO’s official aviation unit — which operates five helicopters and three fixed-wing aircraft covering 8,000-plus square miles **Error! Bookmark not defined.** — and private aviation assets that provide plausible deniability.

### 4.2.3 Christiansen Aviation LLC: Delaware’s Same-Day Registration Factory

On August 29, 2022, Christiansen Aviation LLC registered at least nine aircraft on a single day. The company’s address: Mailboxes Etc #1710, 2207 Concord Pike, Wilmington, Delaware 19803 — a commercial mailbox, not an aviation facility. **Error! Bookmark not defined.** FAA Manufacturer’s Model and Serial (MMS) results confirm sequential N-numbers

---

<sup>70</sup> Tehachapi News. [https://www.tehachapinews.com/news/kcso-stipulated-judgment-extended-two-years/article\\_37790741-ee5f-423d-b985-a280c54ddcde.html](https://www.tehachapinews.com/news/kcso-stipulated-judgment-extended-two-years/article_37790741-ee5f-423d-b985-a280c54ddcde.html)

<sup>71</sup> AE Industrial Partners, LP. <https://www.aeroequity.com/team/>

<sup>72</sup> AE Industrial Partners, LP. <https://www.aeroequity.com/ventures/>

registered to this address: N1210K, N122BC, N1250K, N1260K, N1270K, and N1280K, all Cessna 172S aircraft with sequential serial numbers (12540, 13048, 13050, 13053, 13057, 13064). <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> This pattern is not unique to Christiansen. Multiple Delaware aviation LLCs — ATP Aircraft 6 LLC, ATP Aircraft 7 LLC, CE-172 Aircraft LLC, Career Track 2 LLC — use the same 251 Little Falls Drive address in Wilmington. <sup>73</sup>All register Cessna 172S aircraft at commercial addresses. All exploit Delaware’s corporate anonymity laws to obscure beneficial ownership.

The FAA has recognized this tactic. In a 2019 legal interpretation, the agency ruled that using a registered agent’s address on aircraft registration applications is “not acceptable” because “the registered agent’s address is not the mailing address of the applicant” and “the registered agent’s address is not the physical address of the applicant.” <sup>74</sup>The ruling demonstrates regulatory awareness of shell company tactics. Awareness, however, has not produced enforcement. Christiansen Aviation’s nine same-day registrations remain on the books four years later.

### 4.3 The Watchtower Database Evidence

#### 4.3.1 The Scale of Documented Violations

The Watchtower database contains the most comprehensive record of aerial surveillance activity in Kern County. Across the analysis period (2024–2026), it documents 1,365,336 detections below 1,000 feet, 910,585 detections below 500 feet, and 191,223 detections below 100 feet — the critical threshold where low-flying aircraft pose acute safety risks to persons and property on the ground. <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> Total violations of 14 CFR 91.119: 118,773. Biometric threshold collapses — physiological stress events correlated with aircraft proximity: 111,761. <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> The zero-altitude violations are the most technically damning. A Cessna 172S cannot fly at zero feet unless it has crashed. Yet the database records N786FA at zero feet with one-knot speed — “hovering behavior” — and N787FA at the same impossible parameters. <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> N4022W, another repeat violator, recorded a minimum altitude of negative 25 feet. <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> Negative altitude on a flying aircraft is not a navigation error; it is evidence of ADS-B data manipulation, equipment malfunction so severe the aircraft should be grounded, or deliberate transponder spoofing.


The figure below displays the top five altitude violators in the surveillance network. Every aircraft shown is registered to a shell company or KCSO-affiliated operator. Not one is registered to an identifiable individual pilot or conventional flight school.

---

<sup>73</sup> Justia Law. <https://law.justia.com/codes/california/code-gov/title-1/division-10/part-5/chapter-15/article-1/section-7928-710/>

<sup>74</sup> City of San Diego Official Website. <https://www.sandiego.gov/police/data-transparency/mandated-disclosures/ab481>

**Top Five Altitude Violators — Kern County Surveillance Network  
(14 CFR 91.119 Minimum Safe Altitude Violations, 2024-2026)**



Source: Watchtower Database / Tactical Analysis Report. Negative and zero altitudes are physically impossible for fixed-wing aircraft in flight.

### Top Five Altitude Violators

#### 4.3.2 The April 9, 2026 Convergence

At 19:06 UTC on April 9, 2026 — 12:06 PM Pacific Daylight Time — the Watchtower database recorded a 48-aircraft convergence event.<sup>75</sup> That same morning, at 10:20 AM, Tulare County Deputy Randy Hoppert was shot while serving an eviction notice in Porterville, California, approximately 70 miles north of Bakersfield.<sup>76</sup> The suspect fled; SWAT teams conducted door-to-door searches; police deployed a drone to locate the suspect; and a Kern County Sheriff’s Office BearCat armored vehicle was brought in to assist.<sup>77</sup> The suspect was eventually killed when the BearCat ran over him. **Error! Bookmark not defined.** The convergence of 48 aircraft on the same date as a multi-agency law enforcement incident involving KCSO assets suggests coordinated aerial surveillance of the operation. Whether the convergence was pre-positioning, real-time observation, or post-incident documentation cannot be determined from the database alone. What can be determined is that 48 aircraft — a number that dwarfs KCSO’s official fleet of eight — appeared in coordinated proximity on the same day that KCSO deployed its BearCat to another county to kill a contained suspect. Correlation is not causation. But 48 aircraft do not converge by accident.

#### 4.3.3 The Network Summary

The table below consolidates the documented aircraft operating in Kern County’s surveillance network, their registered ownership, observed activities, and regulatory

<sup>75</sup> GrowthCap. <https://growthcapadvisory.com/firms/ae-industrial-partners-lp/>

<sup>76</sup> Visalia Times-Delta. <https://www.visaliatimesdelta.com/story/news/local/2026/04/09/porterville-police-reportedly-responding-to-active-shooting/89538172007/>

<sup>77</sup> youtube.com. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VNWFatG1u5M>

violations. Together, these aircraft account for thousands of violations of federal aviation safety regulations, multiple instances of physically impossible flight data, and at least one confirmed case of medical aircraft identity masking.

Tail Number	Registered Owner	Aircraft Type	Documented Activity	Total Violations	Min Altitude	Avg Altitude
N786FA	ALF IX LLC (RESIDCO)	Cessna 172S	Primary surveillance; transponder discrepancy (AAA74E vs. 32171FC) Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined.	1,503 Error! Bookmark not defined.	0 ft Error! Bookmark not defined.	944 ft Error! Bookmark not defined.
N787FA	ALF IX LLC (RESIDCO)	Cessna 172S	Secondary surveillance; zero-ft "hovering" Error! Bookmark not defined.	959	0 ft	967 ft
N789FA	ALF IX LLC (RESIDCO)	Cessna 172S	Multi-role operations	1,307	0 ft	1,087 ft
N790FA	ALF IX LLC (RESIDCO)	Cessna 172S	High-activity surveillance; 38 passes on 11/20/2025 Error!	1,051	—	1,121 ft

Tail Number	Registered Owner	Aircraft Type	Documented Activity	Total Violations	Min Altitude	Avg Altitude
			Bookmark not defined.			
N791FA	ALF IX LLC (RESIDCO)	Cessna 172S	“Aggressor” role; lowest avg altitude in fleet Error! Bookmark not defined.	1,307 Error! Bookmark not defined.	0 ft Error! Bookmark not defined.	852 ft Error! Bookmark not defined.
N916GW	9K Air LLC	MD 500E Helicopter	KCSO-affiliated; direct LE coordination Error! Bookmark not defined.	1,095 Error! Bookmark not defined.	0 ft Error! Bookmark not defined.	1,366 ft Error! Bookmark not defined.
N916BQ	9K Air LLC	MD 500E Helicopter	KCSO-affiliated operations Error! Bookmark not defined.	1,020 Error! Bookmark not defined.	0 ft Error! Bookmark not defined.	1,022 ft Error! Bookmark not defined.
N743AM	Air Methods / Mercy Air	(Radar: medical)	Identity masking: visually confirmed as KCSO helicopter Error! Bookmark not defined.	—	—	—
N223AM	Air Methods LLC	Bell 407	Based Ridgecrest; “stealth operation	—	—	—

Tail Number	Registered Owner	Aircraft Type	Documented Activity	Total Violations	Min Altitude	Avg Altitude
			ns" with lights disabled Error! Bookmark not defined. 78			
N229AM	Mercy Air	(Medical - marked)	Hammer -Anvil tactical pattern; HR 113 bpm correlated Error! Bookmark not defined.	—	—	—
N1210K - N1280K	Christiansen Aviation LLC	Cessna 172S fleet	Batch-registered 8/29/2022; Delaware mailbox address Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined.	—	—	—
N912KC	Kern County Sheriff's Office	Airbus H125	Official KCSO fleet; 600+ hrs since	—	—	—

<sup>78</sup> Pensions & Investments. <https://www.pionline.com/searches-and-hires/kern-county-employees-earmarks-70-million-buyout-distressed-debt-funds/>

Tail Number	Registered Owner	Aircraft Type	Documented Activity	Total Violations	Min Altitude	Avg Altitude
			2023 <sup>79</sup>			
N913KC	Kern County Sheriff's Office	Airbus H125	Official KCSO fleet; 93.3% behavioral consistency	—	—	—

The table reveals a structured operational ecology. ALF IX LLC provides the fixed-wing surveillance backbone — five aircraft generating 6,127 documented violations. 9K Air LLC provides rotary-wing assets with direct KCSO coordination. Medical aircraft (N743AM, N223AM, N229AM) provide identity masking and tactical pattern support. Christiansen Aviation provides a reserve fleet of batch-registered aircraft available for surge operations. KCSO's official fleet (N912KC, N913KC) provides the command-and-control layer, with the H125 helicopters optimized for loitering and surveillance having accumulated over 600 flight hours each in their first two years of service. **Error! Bookmark not defined.** The regulatory framework exists to prevent exactly this kind of operation. 14 CFR 91.119 mandates minimum safe altitudes. **Error! Bookmark not defined.** 14 CFR 91.225 mandates accurate ADS-B transponder operation. <sup>80</sup>The FAA's own guidance states that altitude violations should be reported to the local Flight Standards District Office, which "will attempt to identify the offending aircraft operator" through flight records and air traffic control information. <sup>81</sup>The Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association notes that 14 CFR 91.119 is "among the most cited regulations in FAA investigation reports." <sup>82</sup>Yet 118,773 violations later, no enforcement action is visible in the public record. Aircraft registered to Delaware mailbox addresses continue to circle Kern County neighborhoods at altitudes that would ground any identifiable pilot. Medical helicopters fly surveillance patterns while wearing paint schemes designed to evoke trust and emergency priority. And on April 9, 2026, 48 aircraft converged on the same day that a Kern County BearCat crushed a suspect 70 miles away — an event that, like the surveillance network itself, occurred entirely outside the scope of the federal stipulated judgment that is supposed to be reforming this agency.

<sup>79</sup> KMPH. <https://kmp.com/news/local/kern-county-sheriff-says-it-was-his-deputy-that-ran-over-suspected-killer-in-porterville-tulare-detective-randy-hoppert-swat-rook-bearcat-david-eric-morales>

<sup>80</sup> Ramp at Harbor Boulevard in San Pedro | News | Port of Los Angeles. <https://portoflosangeles.org/community/los-angeles-port-police/military-equipment-funding-ab-481>

<sup>81</sup> [cccera.gov. https://www.cccera.gov/sites/main/files/file-attachments/1\\_-\\_accessibility\\_of\\_investment\\_records.pdf?1677265192](https://www.cccera.gov/sites/main/files/file-attachments/1_-_accessibility_of_investment_records.pdf?1677265192)

<sup>82</sup> UCSF POLICE DEPARTMENT. <https://police.ucsf.edu/california-assembly-bill-481-ab-481>

The SJ regulates firearms, electronic control weapons, batons, OC spray, and canines across 68 detailed items. It says nothing about helicopters. Nothing about armored vehicles. Nothing about coordinated aerial surveillance networks operating through shell companies with spoofed transponders and stolen medical identities. The oversight gap is not accidental. It is the airspace in which KCSO's shadow network flies.

---

## 5. Use of Force: America's Deadliest Police

For more than a decade, independent data, federal investigations, and jury verdicts have documented a single inescapable fact: Kern County Sheriff's Office deputies kill civilians at rates exceeding every comparable jurisdiction in the United States. Its internal review mechanisms have proven structurally incapable of identifying misconduct that federal juries later confirm with multimillion-dollar awards. This chapter presents the empirical record — the per-capita killing rates, the 85.7% decline in officer-involved shootings under stipulated judgment oversight, the \$57.8 million in taxpayer-funded settlements, and the paradox of declining lethal force paired with surging citizen complaints.

### 5.1 The Statistical Record

#### 5.1.1 *The Guardian Baseline: Highest Per-Capita Killing Rate in the United States*

In December 2015, *The Guardian* published “The County: the story of America's deadliest police,” a five-part series establishing the quantitative benchmark for all subsequent KCSO violence metrics<sup>83</sup>. In 2015 alone, Kern County law enforcement — KCSO and Bakersfield Police Department (BPD) combined — killed 13 people. The NYPD, with nearly ten times the population and 23 times as many sworn officers, killed nine<sup>84</sup>. The resulting rate of 1.5 per 100,000 residents placed Kern County at the top of all U.S. jurisdictions measured

**Error! Bookmark not defined.**

Over the preceding decade, from 2005 to 2015, Kern County law enforcement killed 79 people at an average rate of 0.9 per 100,000 residents — the highest civilian-killing rate of any U.S. county<sup>85</sup><sup>86</sup>. Racial disparities within these figures are acute. Police Scorecard data documents 31 police killings in Kern County, with Black residents killed at 2.1 times the rate of white residents despite comprising just 5% of the population<sup>87</sup><sup>88</sup>.

---

<sup>83</sup> Chain | Cohn | Clark. <https://www.chainlaw.com/deadliest-police-kern-county-silva-wrongful-death-guardian-counted/>

<sup>84</sup> The Atlantic. <https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/the-deadliest-county-for-police-killings-in-america/418359/>

<sup>85</sup> sclawreview.org. <https://sclawreview.org/article/the-role-of-fault-in-%C2%A7-1983-municipal-liability/>

<sup>86</sup> Grokipedia. [https://grokipedia.com/page/bryan\\_v\\_macpherson](https://grokipedia.com/page/bryan_v_macpherson)

<sup>87</sup> policescorecard.org. <https://policescorecard.org/ca/sheriff/kern-county>

<sup>88</sup> nyumootcourt.org. <https://proceedings.nyumootcourt.org/2025/02/farmer-versus-kingsley-applying-the-subjective-standard-to-evaluate-deliberate-indifference-claims-brought-by-incarcerated-individuals-awaiting-trial/>

### 5.1.2 Fifty-Four Fatal Shootings, Zero Accountability

Between 2005 and 2015, KCSO and BPD officers were involved in 54 fatal shootings. All 54 were ruled justified by internal review panels <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. A zero-sustained-finding rate across more than a decade is not an anomaly — it is structural. Internal review panels operate within the same chain of command as the officers they evaluate, applying policies drafted by the same administration they report to. The pattern persisted until the California Department of Justice opened a pattern-and-practice investigation in December 2016 under then-Attorney General Kamala Harris, culminating in a stipulated judgment in December 2020.

### 5.1.3 The OIS Trajectory: A Decline That Masks Deeper Problems

Officer-involved shootings under the stipulated judgment demonstrate a clear downward trend, but the metric requires careful interpretation. The available annual data points show a decline from 14 OIS in 2020 — the year the stipulated judgment entered — to 2 OIS in 2023, representing an 85.7% reduction <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>.

Year	KCSO OIS Count	Citizen Complaints	OIS Change	Complaint Change	Context
2020	14	—	Baseline	—	SJ entered December 2020 <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>
2022	5	353	-64.3%	Baseline	SJ fully active
2023	2	512	-60.0%	+45.0%	Lowest OIS in recorded period <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>

Year	KCSO OIS Count	Citizen Complaints	OIS Change	Complaint Change	Context
2024	—	288	—	-43.8%	Data conflict: alternative source cites 453 <sup>89</sup> 90
2025	—	382	—	+32.6%	5th year of SJ oversight [^CompAudit^]


*Table 5.1: KCSO Officer-Involved Shootings and Citizen Complaint Trajectory (2020–2025). OIS data from KCSO and monitor reports; complaint data from Internal Affairs Annual Reports. The 85.7% OIS reduction (2020–2023) coincides with a complaint surge that suggests non-lethal misconduct may have displaced lethal encounters.*

This decline is not the success metric KCSO officials present. Police consultant Dr. Tommy Tunson attributed at least part of the OIS reduction to “the Ferguson effect” — officers becoming reluctant to engage in proactive policing to avoid civil liability <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. A reduction driven by disengagement rather than de-escalation produces a favorable headline while leaving the underlying culture intact.

The complaint data supports this interpretation. Complaints surged 45.0% from 353 in 2022 to 512 in 2023, then declined to 288 in 2024 before jumping 32.6% to 382 in 2025 <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> [^CompAudit^]. The 2024 figure carries a data integrity warning: one source reports 288 complaints <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>, another states 453 <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. The discrepancy itself raises questions about KCSO data management under stipulated judgment transparency requirements. The net trajectory is unambiguous: five years into oversight, complaints are rising.

<sup>89</sup> KCSO. [https://www.kernsheriff.org/document-library/20250709141125\\_2024-Internal-Affairs-Annual-Report.pdf](https://www.kernsheriff.org/document-library/20250709141125_2024-Internal-Affairs-Annual-Report.pdf)

<sup>90</sup> KCSO. [https://www.kernsheriff.org/document-library/20260331144217\\_2025-Internal-Affairs-Annual-Report.pdf](https://www.kernsheriff.org/document-library/20260331144217_2025-Internal-Affairs-Annual-Report.pdf)



### The Use-of-Force Paradox: Declining Shootings, Surging Complaints

Figure 5.1: Dual-axis chart showing KCSO officer-involved shootings (bars, left axis) and citizen complaints (line, right axis), 2020–2025. The 85.7% OIS reduction coincides with a 32.6% complaint increase from 2024 to 2025, suggesting that lethal encounters declined while non-lethal misconduct persisted or intensified. Sources: KCSO Internal Affairs Annual Reports, Monitoring Team Annual Reports, Comprehensive Audit.

The 2023 complaint breakdown reveals the categories of concern: of 512 total complaints, 140 alleged neglect of duty, 75 alleged rude conduct, and 29 alleged excessive force <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. KCSO found 199 complaints — 38.9% — “unfounded,” meaning investigators concluded the reported acts did not occur. Only 27 complaints, or 5.3%, were “sustained” <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. Dr. Tunson publicly questioned the unfounded rate: “Incredible! Based on what they’re saying, is everybody filing frivolous lawsuits against them?” <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup> The disparity between a 38.9% unfounded rate and a 5.3% sustained rate is consistent with either an extraordinarily litigious citizenry or a systematic minimization protocol — and the \$30.5 million Mickel Lewis verdict suggests the latter interpretation carries more weight.

## 5.2 The Settlement Tax

### 5.2.1 Taxpayer-Funded Liability

The financial cost of KCSO’s use-of-force patterns falls entirely on Kern County residents. Known settlements and verdicts from 2010 through 2026 total \$57.8 million — and this represents only publicly reported cases with disclosed amounts <sup>91 Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>.

Case	Year	Amount	Type	Circumstance
------	------	--------	------	--------------

<sup>91</sup> Chain | Cohn | Clark. <https://www.chainlaw.com/california-department-of-justice-settlement-kern-county-sheriff-civil-rights-violations-chain-cohn-stiles-cases/>

Case	Year	Amount	Type	Circumstance
<i>Estate of Mickel Lewis Sr.</i>	2025	\$30,500,000	Jury verdict	Unarmed man shot 5 times, twice in back; 2nd largest CA police shooting verdict <small>Error! Bookmark not defined.</small>
<i>Hiley v. County of Kern</i>	2015/2016	\$8,800,000	Settlement	Deputy driving 80 mph in 45 mph zone, no lights/siren; two fatalities <small>Error! Bookmark not defined.</small>
<i>Moore v. County of Kern</i>	~2018	\$6,000,000	Settlement	Jail inmate beaten to death by deputies; 3 deputies prosecuted <small>Error! Bookmark not defined.</small>
<i>Maharrey v. County of Kern</i>	~2018	\$3,800,000	Settlement	Deputy made illegal left turn, killed motorcyclist <small>Error! Bookmark not defined.</small>
<i>Silva v. County of Kern</i>	2016	\$3,400,000	Settlement	Beaten, bitten, hog-tied by deputies; died <small>Error! Bookmark not defined.</small>
<i>Fleeman v. County of Kern</i>	2025	\$300,000	Settlement	Retaliation: fired for challenging Youngblood in 2018 election <sup>92</sup>
<i>Estate of David Garcia</i>	2018	Undisclosed	Settlement	Shot unarmed leaving house on suicide call <small>Error! Bookmark not defined.</small>
<b>Total (known amounts)</b>	<b>2010–2026</b>	<b>\$57,800,000+</b>	—	<i>Excludes undisclosed amounts and defense costs</i>

Table 5.2: Major KCSO Settlements and Verdicts (2010–2026). All amounts represent taxpayer funds. The Mickel Lewis verdict alone equals 8.8% of KCSO’s FY 2025–26 annual budget. Sources: Federal court records, KCSO documents, media reporting.

### 5.2.2 Budget Impact

KCSO’s FY 2025–26 budget totals \$345 million [<sup>^</sup>CompAudit<sup>^</sup>]. The Mickel Lewis verdict of \$30.5 million equals 8.8% of one year’s entire operating budget — for a single shooting

<sup>92</sup> KGET.com. <https://www.kget.com/news/local-news/county-settles-civil-suit-with-former-chief-sheriffs-deputy-fleeman-for-300000/>

**Error! Bookmark not defined.** The cumulative \$57.8 million settlement total represents 16.8% of one year’s budget, spread across approximately fifteen years.

These figures exclude undisclosed legal defense costs. KCSO’s decision to take the Lewis case to trial — after its internal review found the shooting “within policy” — reflects a litigation strategy that prioritized institutional denial over fiscal prudence. Lewis family attorneys stated KCSO “believed the jury pool was going to be racist and pro-cop”<sup>93</sup>. The \$30.5 million verdict, the second-largest police shooting jury award in California history, demonstrates the failure of that calculation **Error! Bookmark not defined.**

The \$57.8 million total also excludes smaller settlements, undisclosed amounts (the David Garcia case), and ongoing liability from the April 2026 Porterville BearCat killing. When the \$12 million helicopter purchase during active stipulated judgment is added, the combined misconduct-plus-equipment total reaches \$69.8 million — 20.2% of one year’s budget **Error! Bookmark not defined.** [CompAudit].

### *5.2.3 The Mickel Lewis Case: Internal Review as Institutional Failure*

The Mickel Lewis Sr. case exposes the credibility deficit of KCSO’s internal review apparatus. Lewis, an unarmed man, was shot five times by a KCSO deputy, two rounds in his back. KCSO’s internal review found the shooting “within policy.” A federal jury disagreed, awarding \$30.5 million in March 2025 — the second-largest police shooting verdict in California history **Error! Bookmark not defined.**

The sequence matters: internal review found compliance; federal jury found unconstitutional homicide. This pattern — 54 fatal shootings ruled justified by internal panels, followed by \$57.8 million in external verdicts — demonstrates that KCSO’s internal review process is structurally invested in preserving the appearance of legitimacy. When Sheriff Youngblood states KCSO is “really close to being done” with stipulated judgment compliance while the DOJ simultaneously extends oversight for two additional years, the divergence between internal and external assessment frameworks measures institutional self-deception [PortervilleReport] **Error! Bookmark not defined.**

## **5.3 Post-Stipulated Judgment Violence**

### *5.3.1 Continued Fatal Encounters Under Federal Oversight*

Despite more than five years of stipulated judgment oversight, KCSO has continued to generate fatal encounters and excessive force incidents that attract external scrutiny. The stipulated judgment was entered in December 2020 with an original duration of three years. By February 2026, the court had extended it for an additional two years, to 2028, due to continued non-compliance across five of eight major areas: Use of Force Policy, Canine Policy, Searches and Seizures, Supervisor Oversight, and Community Policing **Error! Bookmark not defined.** [CompAudit].

---

<sup>93</sup> Atlanta Black Star. <https://atlantablackstar.com/2025/03/25/california-family-of-black-man-shot-in-the-back-by-deputies-wins-30-5m-award/>

The April 9, 2026 killing of David Eric Morales in Porterville — in which KCSO SWAT deputies used a BearCat armored vehicle to run over and kill a contained suspect — occurred while KCSO was under active DOJ oversight for civil rights violations. The stipulated judgment governing KCSO contains 68 compliance items comprehensively regulating firearms, electronic control weapons, batons, OC spray, canines, and physical control techniques. It contains zero provisions for armored vehicles or aviation operations [^PortervilleReport^]. This regulatory gap enabled the deployment of a 16-ton armored vehicle as an offensive weapon against a contained suspect without any stipulated judgment prohibition — an exploitation of oversight boundaries that KCSO has systematically leveraged.

### *5.3.2 POST Decertification: Accountability Through License Revocation*

California’s Senate Bill 2 (SB 2), effective January 2023, created a statewide mechanism for decertifying officers found to have committed serious misconduct. The Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Commission has received approximately 42{,}000 misconduct reports since implementation, including roughly 18{,}000 retroactive “lookback” cases, and has taken certification action against 203 officers <sup>94 95</sup>.

KCSO officers feature prominently in early decertification data. In February 2024, Dustin S. Lancaster voluntarily surrendered his POST certification <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. David Wesley Hubbard, a 16-year KCSO veteran, became only the second peace officer in California decertified through the SB 2 process in June 2024, for on-duty sexual conduct with a subordinate, evidence destruction, and sharing confidential internal affairs information <sup>96</sup>. In December 2025, Michael Clark had his certification revoked following conviction for sexual battery, assault by a public officer, false imprisonment, and stalking <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. Detentions deputy Brandon Michael Lawrence was added to the decertification list in 2023 <sup>97</sup>.

With at least four KCSO officers facing POST decertification actions, the department is overrepresented relative to its size. The statewide certification action rate of approximately 0.2% of licensees annually means a department of KCSO’s scale would expect fewer than three actions; KCSO has produced at least four <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>.

### *5.3.3 The Lethal-to-Non-Lethal Shift*

The 85.7% OIS reduction alongside a 32.6% complaint increase presents a pattern undermining claims of successful reform. Two explanations compete: officers learned to substitute non-lethal force for lethal force, or the stipulated judgment improved reporting systems, revealing hidden misconduct that was always present.

Either interpretation is damning. If officers shifted from lethal to non-lethal abuse, the stipulated judgment addressed the most visible symptom — dead bodies — while leaving

---

<sup>94</sup> <https://thepclawgroup.com/monell-liability>

<sup>95</sup> San Francisco Police Department. <https://www.sanfranciscopolice.org/law-enforcement-equipment-policy>

<sup>96</sup> yahoo.com. <https://www.yahoo.com/news/former-kern-county-sheriff-office-013758319.html>

<sup>97</sup> DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law.

<https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1021&context=endnotes>

unconstitutional force intact. If improved reporting revealed hidden misconduct, then pre-SJ data was systematically understated. The monitor reports do not distinguish between these explanations; they report OIS counts as a success metric. But the 382 complaints in 2025, the \$30.5 million Lewis verdict for a shooting KCSO found “within policy,” and the Porterville BearCat killing — all after five years of oversight — suggest the OIS decline is compliance theater, not cultural transformation.

The broader context reinforces this. Kern County’s homicide rate ranked first in California in 2020 (12.7 per 100{,}000) and 2021 (13.7 per 100{,}000)<sup>98 99</sup>. In 2024, violent crime fell 17.2% — the largest decline among California’s 15 largest counties — with homicides dropping from 15 to 7<sup>100</sup>. This decline exceeds what stipulated judgment reforms alone would predict, suggesting macro factors influence force metrics independently of oversight. The question is not whether OIS declined; it is whether the decline reflects genuine reform or strategic displacement of violence into forms that generate fewer headlines and more complaints.

The data points toward displacement. When an agency under federal oversight reduces shootings while complaints surge, purchases \$12 million in helicopters while settlements consume 8.8% of its budget, and deploys an armored vehicle as a weapon without violating any of its 68 stipulated judgment items, the metrics of reform require harder scrutiny than the monitoring team has applied.

---

## 6. Monitor Capture: How Oversight Failed

The California Department of Justice entered into a stipulated judgment (SJ) with the Kern County Sheriff’s Office in December 2020 after finding a pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct, including excessive force and unreasonable stops, searches, and seizures. The SJ anticipated compliance “within five years of the Effective Date.”<sup>Error!</sup> **Bookmark not defined.** Five years later, a judge granted a two-year extension because, as DOJ informed the court, “elements to comply with the judgement have not yet been met.”<sup>Error!</sup> **Bookmark not defined.** This chapter examines not KCSO’s non-compliance alone, but how the monitoring process designed to enforce the SJ was systematically captured by the monitored agency — producing reports that neutralized criticism, normalized delay, and transformed oversight into a legitimizing mechanism for the status quo.

### 6.1 The Diplomatic Language Problem

#### 6.1.1 “Acknowledge and Appreciate” — Neutralizing Criticism Before It Registers

The Monitoring Team’s (MT) annual reports follow a consistent rhetorical architecture: acknowledge challenges, then pivot to appreciation, effectively defusing any criticism before it can register with readers or the court. The Year 3 report exemplifies this pattern.

---

<sup>98</sup> KBAK. <https://bakersfieldnow.com/news/local/kern-county-no-longer-number-one-for-highest-homicide-rate-in-ca>

<sup>99</sup> CalMatters. <https://calmatters.org/explainers/california-crime-numbers/>

<sup>100</sup> Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers. <https://www.fletc.gov/use-force-part-iv>

After noting that “engaging productively with the community and the CAC and staying on top of the various provisions throughout the SJ continue to be time- and resource-intensive endeavors,” the MT immediately pivots: “KCSO personnel typically respond to feedback quickly and are open to MT and DOJ feedback and to productive collaboration. The MT applauds the continued efforts and leadership demonstrated by KCSO.” Error! Bookmark not defined.The SJ found a pattern of unconstitutional conduct. Five years later, the MT is still “applauding” efforts that have not produced compliance.

The Year 4 report opens with similar framing: “We appreciate the commitment and collaborative spirit that KCSO, County personnel, and the CAC have continued to show over the past year.” Error! Bookmark not defined.This appreciation precedes any substantive findings, establishing a cooperative interpretive lens through which all subsequent non-compliance is filtered.

### *6.1.2 “Forthcoming,” “Cooperative,” “Diligent” — Process Engagement as Compliance Substitute*

The MT consistently characterizes KCSO using language that conflates cooperation with compliance. The Year 2 report describes KCSO as “forthcoming and cooperative” and “willing to roll up their sleeves to get the work done” even while noting the department “face[s] significant challenges that impact their ability to come into compliance with the SJ in a timely manner.” Error! Bookmark not defined.The Year 3 report praises KCSO’s “commitment to improve organizational systems” while acknowledging that actual compliance “has not yet been achieved.” Error! Bookmark not defined.The Year 4 report describes KCSO staff as “diligent, collaborative, and prompt” while admitting policies remain unapproved and compliance metrics are still not finalized. Error! Bookmark not defined.This framing creates the *cooperation fallacy* — the substitution of process engagement for substantive outcomes. Each MT report treats policy submission as progress, revision rounds as momentum, and meetings attended as evidence of reform. The diplomatic language functions as a compliance laundering mechanism, converting documented non-compliance into narratives of diligent effort.

The contrast with Sheriff Youngblood’s public statements exposes the gap. While the MT describes KCSO as “collaborative,” Youngblood “says his office has met its milestones and blames state monitors for delays as a judge grants the DOJ two more” years. Error! Bookmark not defined.The MT’s cooperative framing provided political cover for blame-shifting that the extension itself refuted.

### *6.1.3 The Disappearing Community Advisory Council*

The Community Advisory Council (CAC) — the SJ’s primary community accountability mechanism — lost more than one-third of its members during the monitoring period, dropping from 35 to approximately 22 by January 2023. Error! Bookmark not defined.Four members resigned in 2023 alone, citing “delays in responses” and “lack of communication.” The MT reports treat this attrition as a minor administrative note, not systemic dysfunction.

The Year 2 report notes the decline in passing, then pivots to praise: “the Compliance Coordinator appointed additional department staff, both sworn and non-sworn, to join the CAC and work in partnership with its members.” Error! Bookmark not defined. As community members leave in frustration, KCSO fills the gaps with its own personnel, transforming the CAC from an independent body into a KCSO-KCSO dialogue. The MT reports this not as capture but as partnership.

## 6.2 The Iterative Review Trap

### 6.2.1 Endless Rounds, Praised as Progress

The MT reports reveal a pattern of *iterative entrapment* — policies caught in repeated cycles of submission, revision, and resubmission that consume years without achieving final approval. Each round generates diplomatic praise for “progress” while deferring the moment of actual compliance indefinitely.

KCSO’s use-of-force (UOF) policies, the most critical area of the SJ, illustrate this mechanism. First submitted in January 2023, the policies went through “several iterations being exchanged between the parties,” were resubmitted in October 2023, and as of January 2025 — two years later — were still “very close to being found in compliance,” meaning they were still not compliant. Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined. The Year 2 report explicitly acknowledged that “deputies continue to work without the benefit of a revised UOF policy in place and without having received critical associated training that this will require” — yet framed this as merely “unfortunate.” Error! Bookmark not defined. Canine policies followed an identical trajectory. Initially submitted as 16 separate draft policies in May 2021, they were reviewed, returned with comments, consolidated into three to four policies, resubmitted, revised again, and as of January 2025 — nearly four years after initial submission — were still in “final review.” Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined. The MT describes this as “substantial progress toward compliance” rather than what it is: a systematic deferral of policy finalization.

The behavioral mental health area tells the same story: Year 2 next steps included examining whether the Mobile Evaluation Team (MET) was sufficiently staffed; Year 4 next steps still included the same item. Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined. The same deferred action item across three reports — the recursive loop of managed non-compliance made visible.

### 6.2.2 Compliance Status by SJ Area Across Years 2–4


The following table documents compliance status across the SJ’s nine primary areas during the three-year window from January 2023 through January 2025. Status classifications reflect MT report language: “Policy Development” indicates drafting is underway but no formal compliance has been achieved; “Partial Compliance” indicates some policies approved but training or implementation pending; “Full Compliance” indicates sustained operational compliance as assessed by the MT.

SJ Area	Year 2 (Jan 2023)	Year 3 (Jan 2024)	Year 4 (Jan 2025)
Use of Force	Policy development	Policy development	Partial — policies “close”

SJ Area	Year 2 (Jan 2023)	Year 3 (Jan 2024)	Year 4 (Jan 2025)
	Error! Bookmark not defined.	Error! Bookmark not defined.	to approval Error! Bookmark not defined.
Canines	Policy development Error! Bookmark not defined.	Policy development Error! Bookmark not defined.	Partial — “final review” Error! Bookmark not defined.
Stops, Seizures, and Searches	Policy development Error! Bookmark not defined.	Partial — 2 policies approved Error! Bookmark not defined.	Partial — policies approved, training pending Error! Bookmark not defined.
Behavioral Health	Policy development Error! Bookmark not defined.	Partial — CIT training expanded Error! Bookmark not defined.	Full — most provisions compliant Error! Bookmark not defined.
Management and Supervisory	Policy development Error! Bookmark not defined.	Policy development Error! Bookmark not defined.	Policy development — groundwork only Error! Bookmark not defined.
Language Access	Policy development Error! Bookmark not defined.	Policy development Error! Bookmark not defined.	Partial — policy approved Error! Bookmark not defined.
Recruitment, Hiring, Promotions	Partial — plan developed Error! Bookmark not defined.	Partial — vacancies reduced Error! Bookmark not defined.	Full — multiple areas compliant Error! Bookmark not defined.
Community Policing	Policy development Error! Bookmark not defined.	Policy development Error! Bookmark not defined.	Policy development — CAC dysfunctional Error! Bookmark not defined.
Personnel Complaint Review	Policy development Error! Bookmark not defined.	Policy development Error! Bookmark not defined.	Policy development — audits pending Error! Bookmark not defined.

After four full years, KCSO had achieved MT-assessed full compliance in only two of nine areas — Behavioral Health and Recruitment, Hiring, and Promotions — both administrative domains measured by documentation rather than field conduct. The core operational areas — Use of Force, Canines, Stops, Management and Supervisory Oversight, and Community Policing — remained incomplete. The UOF policies governing deadly force were still not approved. Data systems required for meaningful oversight were deferred to

2026 — Year 6 of a five-year judgment. **Error! Bookmark not defined.**



*Figure 6.1: Compliance progression (or lack thereof) across nine SJ areas. Scoring: 0 = No Progress, 1 = Policy Development, 2 = Partial Compliance, 3 = Full Compliance. Data synthesized from MT annual reports. **Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined.***

### 6.2.3 Monitor Incapacity Masked as Monitored Cooperation

A striking feature of the MT reports is the team’s own admission of delays, which functionally benefit KCSO by providing a ready explanation for continued non-compliance. The Year 3 report acknowledges that “delays within the MT delayed progress” on canine policies and audits, noting that “KCSO had been working diligently to ensure these audits complied with the SJ, but the MT was unable to provide timely feedback.” **Error! Bookmark not defined.** The Year 4 report extends this self-criticism: “As expected, the repercussions of those delays continued to impact the work in this reporting period. Compliance for training and implementation by KCSO cannot be achieved until policies are approved.” **Error! Bookmark not defined.** This framing transforms a multi-year delay cascade into a natural administrative consequence rather than systemic oversight failure. KCSO benefits doubly: its non-compliance is attributed partly to MT staffing problems, and the MT’s diplomatic language ensures these admissions never trigger court intervention.

The MT’s dual role as both assessor and technical assistance provider created a fundamental conflict. The Year 2 report notes the MT “provided technical assistance (TA) to KCSO on many of the topics outlined in the Stipulated Judgement” while simultaneously tasked with independent compliance assessment. **Error! Bookmark not defined.** When the MT helps draft policies and then assesses them, it has an incentive to approve what it helped develop. This is collaborative consulting with a compliance stamp, not independent oversight.

## 6.3 Institutional Capture Mechanisms

### 6.3.1 The SJ Compliance Team — Careers Built on Managing Non-Compliance

In September 2023, KCSO established a dedicated Compliance Bureau — an institutional structure whose existence depends on the SJ’s continuation. **Error! Bookmark not defined.** The

Bureau encompasses the Professional Standards Unit, Body Worn Camera Unit, and Correctional Standards Unit, led by the Compliance Coordinator. Staffing has grown: a full-time sergeant supervises the BWC unit, an analyst was added, and KCSO contracted a university professor for data analysis. Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined. This growing apparatus has a vested interest in the SJ's continuation — if KCSO achieved full compliance, the Bureau's primary function would disappear. Its expansion during non-compliance suggests the SJ has become an institutionalized revenue stream rather than a time-limited reform mandate.

### *6.3.2 Monitor Financial Dependence as Disincentive*

The MT is operated by Evident Change (formerly National Council on Crime and Delinquency), a nonprofit research organization funded by foundations including the Open Society Foundations and MacArthur Foundation, focused on “technical assistance, consulting, training, research, and analytics” — not enforcement. Error! Bookmark not defined. This organizational culture, oriented toward collaborative consulting rather than adversarial enforcement, is reflected in the MT's diplomatic language and its willingness to accept multi-year delays as natural consequences of reform.

The monitor's financial dependence on continued engagement creates structural pressure to avoid declarations of compliance failure. If the MT reported that KCSO had fundamentally failed, the court might terminate or restructure the monitoring arrangement — ending Evident Change's revenue stream. The MT's reports function as legitimizing documents because they consistently frame process engagement as progress.

The MT's own website positions the monitor as subordinate to the monitored: “The Monitors shall not, and are not intended to, replace or assume the role and duties of the Sheriff.” Error! Bookmark not defined. The monitor lacks authority to compel compliance. It can only report and recommend. The sheriff retains all operational authority — including the authority to defer, delay, and deflect.

### *6.3.3 CAC Dysfunction — Structural Failures Made Invisible*

The SJ requires only that KCSO “work and meaningfully engage with its CAC” — there is no requirement to follow recommendations or document how input was addressed. Error! Bookmark not defined. This advisory-only framework ensures the CAC has no formal authority to compel action, approve or reject policies, or impose consequences.

The CAC's resource starvation compounds its powerlessness. The Year 2 report documents the CAC is “volunteer and unpaid” — while KCSO has dedicated paid staff to manage CAC engagement. Error! Bookmark not defined. Community members read complex law enforcement policies while juggling full-time jobs; KCSO's Compliance Coordinator — a paid KCSO employee — tracks and controls documentation of all community input. Error! Bookmark not defined. The MT agreed “more resources should be provided” but had no authority to compel them. Error! Bookmark not defined. The recommendation was repeated across multiple reports without effect — performative concern producing no structural change.

As members resigned over “delays in responses” and “lack of communication,” KCSO responded by appointing “additional department staff, both sworn and non-sworn, to join the CAC.” Error! Bookmark not defined. This substitution transforms the CAC into an internal feedback loop — the monitored agency talking to itself while the MT describes the process as “meaningful engagement.”

The capture of the monitoring process was achieved not through overt obstruction but through diplomatic language, iterative delay, institutional co-optation, and resource asymmetry. Five years of MT reports produced a paper trail of cooperation that masked persistent non-compliance. The 2-year extension granted in March 2026 represents the minimum necessary response Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined. — but without fundamental reform of the monitoring structure, the extension risks becoming the next chapter in the same story.

---

---

## 7. The Accountability Evasion Architecture: Cross-Dimensional Insights

The preceding six chapters documented discrete systems: the Stipulated Judgment’s regulatory gaps, the Porterville killing’s constitutional violations, the financial web linking public pensions to private equity, the surveillance network’s shell company architecture, the use-of-force patterns that produced \$57.8 million in taxpayer-funded settlements, and the monitoring process’s systematic capture by the agency it was designed to oversee. Each chapter stands on its own evidentiary foundation. But none reveals the architecture that holds them together.

This chapter identifies the structural patterns that emerge only when evidence from all twelve research dimensions is compared simultaneously. These are not summaries of earlier findings. They are non-obvious insights — analytical conclusions that exist in the spaces between chapters, visible only through cross-dimensional comparison.

### 7.1 Ten Non-Obvious Patterns

#### 7.1.1 *The Multi-Layered Architecture: Mutual Protection Among Five Systems*

The most consequential cross-dimensional finding is structural: KCSO has constructed a five-layer accountability evasion system in which each layer protects all others.

**Layer one** is the Stipulated Judgment’s regulatory gaps. The SJ’s 68 items comprehensively regulate firearms, electronic control weapons, batons, OC spray, canines, and physical control techniques — but contain zero provisions for armored vehicles, helicopters, or aerial surveillance. Error! Bookmark not defined. KCSO exploited this systematically: purchasing \$12 million in Airbus H125 helicopters during active SJ oversight while maintaining 21–37 percent deputy vacancy rates, and deploying its BearCat as a lethal weapon in Porterville while still “under federal oversight.” Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined. The SJ regulated equipment KCSO already possessed while placing no constraints on new capabilities acquired during monitoring.

**Layer two** is monitor capture. The Monitoring Team’s diplomatic language — KCSO described as “forthcoming and cooperative,” “diligent, collaborative, and prompt” — neutralizes public pressure by making non-compliance invisible. Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined. The iterative review trap — policies perpetually “very close to being found in compliance” without ever achieving it — converts delay into a normalized feature of the process. Error! Bookmark not defined. **Layer three** is narrative control. Youngblood’s 24-hour narrative seizure after Porterville — framing Morales as “lying in wait” and declaring “all bets are off” before deputies were interviewed — ensures any incident is publicly framed as justified before facts emerge. Error! Bookmark not defined. Research on law enforcement crisis communications confirms that agencies responding first control the narrative framework for months. Error! Bookmark not defined. **Layer four** is financial opacity. KCERA’s \$35 million commitment to AE Industrial Partners flows through Gov Code § 7928.710, which exempts county retirement system alternative investment details from public records disclosure. Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined. This shield prevents tracing the circular flow: county taxpayers fund KCERA (\$6.9 billion in assets), KCERA invests in AE Industrial, AE Industrial owns aerospace and surveillance portfolio companies, and KCSO purchases aviation services from the same sector. LACERA’s \$350 million commitment to AE Industrial Partners IV reveals this pattern extends statewide. Error! Bookmark not defined. **Layer five** is the RICO-capable enterprise structure. The network of ALF IX LLC, 9K Air LLC, RESIDCO, AE Industrial Partners, and KCSO itself presents a classic association-in-fact enterprise under *Boyle v. United States*, 556 U.S. 938 (2009): common purpose, ongoing organization, and ascertainable structure. Error! Bookmark not defined. Shell company registrations, transponder spoofing, and 118,773 documented aviation violations constitute predicate acts satisfying the “pattern of racketeering activity” requirement. Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined. The mutual protection operates as follows: SJ gaps enable the surveillance network and armored vehicle deployment; monitor diplomacy reduces public pressure; narrative control ensures electoral insulation; financial opacity hides conflicts of interest motivating equipment procurement over personnel; and the RICO structure provides legal insulation through layered entities. Attack any single layer and the others compensate.

### 7.1.2 The Reform-as-Investment Paradox

The budget math reveals a deliberate choice to invest in the appearance of reform rather than its substance. KCSO’s budget grew 39 percent — from \$245 million to \$343 million — during the SJ period while staffing crises persisted and five of eight compliance areas remained deficient. Error! Bookmark not defined. The \$6–7 million in direct monitoring costs produced no sustained compliance. Error! Bookmark not defined. The \$57.8 million in settlements — paid from county funds, not grant funds — produced no policy change because settlements are insured and passed to taxpayers. Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined. The \$12 million helicopter purchase was approved during the same Board meeting that allocated \$300,000 for four fire dispatch positions. Error! Bookmark not defined. This is not failed reform. It is successful investment in organizational self-preservation. Actual reform would reduce KCSO’s autonomy and require personnel-based approaches. The current configuration — perpetual non-compliance under perpetual monitoring — preserves organizational power while generating revenue streams for consultants, equipment vendors, and legal defense contractors. The Monitoring Team itself, operated by Evident

Change, has a financial interest in the SJ's continuation: if KCSO achieved full compliance, Evident Change's revenue stream would end. Error! Bookmark not defined. The \$30.5 million Lewis verdict, equal to 8.8 percent of one year's entire operating budget, did not trigger policy change because the county's risk management structure insulates decision-makers from financial consequences. Error! Bookmark not defined.#### 7.1.3 The Pension-Industrial Surveillance Complex

The KCERA → AE Industrial → Aerospace Portfolio → KCSO Procurement circuit is not a local anomaly. It is a statewide business model. LACERA's \$350 million commitment to AE Industrial Partners IV reveals that California's \$800 billion-plus public pension system is systematically invested in the aerospace and defense sector — the same sector that sells surveillance and military equipment back to California law enforcement agencies. Error! Bookmark not defined. The circular incentive structure operates across multiple jurisdictions simultaneously. KCERA invests \$35 million; LACERA invests \$350 million; both commit to the same private equity firm that owns portfolio companies in aviation, surveillance technology, and tactical equipment; and the law enforcement agencies serving those same counties purchase equipment from the sector their pension funds are invested in. The pension returns depend, in part, on sector growth — which is driven, in part, by law enforcement procurement decisions made by sheriffs whose departments are funded by the same counties whose pension systems hold the investments.

Senate Bill 1319, the "Private Equity Sunshine Act" introduced in April 2026, was drafted precisely because this pattern is becoming visible. Error! Bookmark not defined. The bill would require public pension funds to disclose fees, expenses, and performance data for alternative investments — the transparency mechanism that could break the opacity shield.

#### *7.1.4 The Monitor Capture → Public Apathy Pipeline*

The MT's diplomatic language does not merely mask failure to policymakers. It actively suppresses public engagement. When monitors describe KCSO as "cooperative" while documenting five years of failure, residents receive no signal that reform is urgent. This engineered opacity contributes directly to low voter turnout in sheriff races and limited community organizing. The pipeline operates sequentially: monitors don't sound alarms; media reports "progress" rather than failure; voters don't perceive a crisis; Youngblood faces no electoral consequences; and the SJ extends indefinitely without public pressure. The 2023 CAC dysfunction — four members resigning — was invisible to most residents because neither monitors nor media highlighted it. Error! Bookmark not defined.#### 7.1.5 The Lethal-to-Non-Lethal Abuse Shift

The 85.7 percent reduction in officer-involved shootings between 2020 and 2023 coincided with a 32.6 percent increase in citizen complaints from 288 in 2024 to 382 in 2025. Error! Bookmark not defined. [CompAudit] Two explanations exist: officers substituted non-lethal force for lethal force, reducing deaths but not constitutional violations; or improved reporting revealed hidden misconduct. Both undermine claims of successful reform. The \$30.5 million Lewis verdict supports the first interpretation: KCSO found the shooting "within policy" before a federal jury awarded the second-largest police shooting verdict in

California history, demonstrating the department became more sophisticated in its use of force, not more restrained. [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#)#### 7.1.6 The Federal Grant Subsidy of Non-Compliance

KCSO continued receiving federal grants requiring constitutional compliance certifications while under a Stipulated Judgment for pattern-and-practice civil rights violations. [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) Settlements were paid from county funds, not grant funds. This creates a risk asymmetry: KCSO gets federal money for operations, pays settlements from local taxes, and never faces grant consequences. [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) Under *Universal Health Services v. Escobar*, 579 U.S. 176 (2016), these compliance certifications are “implied false certification” claims viable under the False Claims Act. [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) The DOJ Civil Rights Fraud Initiative, launched in May 2025, may provide a federal pathway even without a private qui tam relator. [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#)#### 7.1.7 The Oversight Gap Exploitation Pattern

The SJ’s exclusion of armored vehicles and aviation is not a drafting oversight. It is a predictable pattern: no major consent decree — Minneapolis, Chicago, New Orleans — contains specific armored vehicle provisions. Agencies under oversight consistently expand capabilities in unregulated domains while appearing to comply in regulated ones. KCSO purchased \$12 million in helicopters and operates a multi-entity surveillance network precisely while under federal oversight. [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) Future consent decrees must include catch-all provisions: “The agency shall not deploy any equipment or tactic not explicitly addressed in this judgment without prior monitor approval and public disclosure.”

### [7.1.8 The Sheriff-as-CEO Business Model](#)

Youngblood operates KCSO not as a constitutional law enforcement agency but as a diversified security services corporation — with aviation (\$12 million fleet), armored vehicles (BearCat), surveillance networks (shell company coordination), and a customer base including other counties (Tulare) and federal agencies (grant funding). The “staffing shortage” is not a crisis. It is a business model that prioritizes capital equipment and inter-agency contracts over personnel costs. The Porterville BearCat deployment to Tulare County was, functionally, an inter-agency contract security service. Budget conditionality should focus on personnel-to-equipment ratios, because the current business model will always favor equipment that generates inter-agency revenue over deputies who generate personnel costs.

## [7.2 The Qualified Immunity Innovation Strategy](#)

### [7.2.1 Exploiting Gaps in “Clearly Established Law”](#)

KCSO’s adoption of novel tactics — using a BearCat as an offensive weapon, deploying shell company aircraft for surveillance — may be strategically designed to exploit a gap in qualified immunity doctrine. Under *Pearson v. Callahan*, 555 U.S. 223 (2009), courts analyze qualified immunity through a two-pronged test, with the second prong requiring that the violated right be “clearly established” at the time of conduct. This creates a powerful incentive to pioneer unprecedented tactics.

*Sabbe v. Washington County* (9th Cir. 2023) is the only federal precedent addressing armored vehicles as weapons — decided just three years before Porterville. Error! Bookmark not defined. No court has ruled on coordinated shell company aircraft surveillance. No court has addressed medical aircraft identity masking for law enforcement purposes. Each novel tactic operates in a gray zone where no “clearly established law” exists, making civil liability nearly impossible regardless of constitutional violation severity.

### 7.2.2 *The Hope v. Pelzer Pathway*

The *Hope v. Pelzer*, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) “obvious case” exception provides a potential workaround: when a constitutional violation is obvious despite absent directly on-point precedent, immunity does not apply. The Porterville deployment may satisfy this — under *Graham v. Connor*, all three reasonableness factors weigh against using a vehicle designed to protect officers from ballistic threats as a weapon to kill a contained suspect. Error! Bookmark not defined. But litigating the *Hope* exception requires a plaintiff with standing, resources, and a court willing to apply it. The 54 shootings ruled “justified” by internal review versus the \$57.8 million in jury verdicts demonstrates that KCSO’s internal process systematically fails to recognize unconstitutional force. Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined. #### 7.2.3 Forward-Looking Policy: Prohibiting Categories, Not Enumerating Acts

Legislators must draft forward-looking policies that prohibit categories of conduct — “armored vehicles shall not be used as offensive weapons against contained suspects” — rather than enumerating specific prohibited acts, which KCSO can innovate around. The SJ’s itemized prohibition approach created the very gaps that enabled Porterville. A categorical approach would prohibit all uses of force not explicitly authorized, regardless of equipment. This principle extends to surveillance: policy should prohibit all aerial surveillance through shell companies or with modified transponder signatures, and require public disclosure of all aviation operations including those conducted through contractors.

## 7.3 The 2028 Temporal Convergence

### 7.3.1 *Three Critical Timelines*

Three distinct timelines converge in 2028, creating a window for coordinated accountability action.

**Timeline one: the Stipulated Judgment extension.** The CA DOJ’s two-year extension, granted March 2026, expires in 2028. The SJ faces its final compliance assessment. If KCSO has not achieved Full and Effective Compliance after seven years, the court must either terminate the SJ (admitting failure), extend it again (perpetuating the compliance theater), or escalate to federal oversight.

**Timeline two: the AE Industrial Fund II term.** KCERA’s \$35 million commitment to AE Industrial Fund II terminates May 18, 2028. Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined. If KCERA exits or renegotiates, AE Industrial’s portfolio companies may face reduced capital access. Senate Bill 1319 may, if passed, require disclosure enabling public tracing of the circular flow from pension to procurement.

**Timeline three: Sheriff Youngblood’s extended term.** Under AB 759, Youngblood’s six-year term ends January 8, 2029, with the 2028 election determining whether he serves a term extending his tenure to 32 years. **Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined.** AB 759 extended sheriff terms from four to six years; the 2028 race will be the first under this structure, meaning a victory extends Youngblood’s control to 2035.

*7.3.2 Strategic Leverage at Convergence*

The convergence creates leverage across financial, legal, and electoral fronts simultaneously. A KCERA divestment push in early 2028, timed with the SJ compliance assessment and sheriff’s race, creates pressure across all three fronts. The SJ findings provide evidentiary ammunition for the electoral campaign. The campaign generates public attention for the divestment push. And the divestment push raises questions about financial conflicts affecting both the SJ narrative and the sheriff’s electoral viability.

*7.3.3 Timeline Convergence Matrix*

**Table 7.1: Timeline Convergence Matrix — The 2028 Accountability Window**

Event	Date	Strategic Lever	Accountability Opportunity
SJ extension expires	March 2028	Judicial enforcement authority	Court decides: terminate (admit failure), extend (perpetuate theater), or escalate to federal oversight/receivership <b>Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>
AE Industrial Fund II term ends	May 18, 2028	Financial/divestment pressure	KCERA exit reduces capital for surveillance-sector portfolio companies; SB 1319 disclosure may reveal circular procurement links <b>Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>

Event	Date	Strategic Lever	Accountability Opportunity
2028 sheriff general election	November 2028	Electoral accountability	First race under AB 759's six-year term; determines whether 22-year tenure extends to 2035 <b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b> <b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>
AB 759 extended term ends	January 8, 2029	Term limit enforcement	New sheriff can restructure Compliance Bureau, renegotiate monitor terms, and halt equipment-first procurement <b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>
SJ final compliance assessment	Throughout 2028	DOJ enforcement discretion	CA DOJ findings on 7 years of compliance support federal pattern-or-practice investigation referral <b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>
POST decertification window	Ongoing through 2028	Administrative enforcement	SB 2 decertification removes individual officers regardless of SJ status or election outcome <b>Error! Bookmark not</b>

101

---

<sup>101</sup> U.S. Department of Justice. [https://www.justice.gov/d9/2023-10/pattern\\_or\\_practice\\_investigation\\_faqs\\_english.pdf](https://www.justice.gov/d9/2023-10/pattern_or_practice_investigation_faqs_english.pdf)

Event	Date	Strategic Lever	Accountability Opportunity defined.
-------	------	-----------------	---

The convergence is historically unique. In no prior year do KCSO’s legal, financial, and electoral futures simultaneously reach inflection points. The architecture of accountability evasion documented across this report is sophisticated, mutually reinforcing, and financially incentivized. But architectures have joints — points where structural pressure produces structural change. The 2028 convergence is the most significant joint identified in this investigation. Whether it produces fracture or merely flexion depends on whether the actors positioned to apply pressure recognize that their separate campaigns are, in fact, fronts in the same fight.

## 8. Legal Pathways to Reform

The accountability evasion architecture documented in preceding chapters does not lack legal vulnerabilities. It lacks coordinated enforcement. The Kern County Sheriff’s Office operates within a dense web of federal and state statutes — civil and criminal, administrative and judicial — that, if activated in concert, can penetrate every layer of the evasion structure. This chapter maps each viable pathway, assigns realistic assessments of likelihood and timeline, and identifies the strategic interdependencies that transform individual legal actions into systemic reform pressure.

No single mechanism is likely to achieve sustained institutional reform alone. The evidence from Pittsburgh, where federal intervention produced temporary compliance that backslid within years after the reform-supporting chief was fired in 2006 <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>, demonstrates that isolated enforcement creates only the appearance of change. Conversely, the Rikers Island receivership — achieved after multiple enforcement mechanisms activated over a decade of litigation — proves that coordinated pressure can compel even the most resistant institutions to yield <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>.

### 8.1 Federal Action

#### 8.1.1 DOJ Civil Rights Division: Pattern-or-Practice Investigation Expansion

The Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division possesses authority under 42 U.S.C. § 14141 to investigate and seek equitable relief against law enforcement agencies engaged in a “pattern or practice” of unconstitutional conduct <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. This statute, created by the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, enables investigations that can result in court-enforceable consent decrees with federal court oversight and independent monitoring teams with broader authority than the current state-level monitor <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>.

The case for federal intervention is compelling. The California DOJ stipulated judgment, extended to 2028 after five years of partial compliance, demonstrates that state-level oversight has proven insufficient <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. The stipulated judgment contains

zero provisions governing aviation operations, aerial surveillance, or coordination with other agencies' aviation assets — a gap KCSO has systematically exploited by purchasing \$12 million in Airbus H125 helicopters and operating a multi-entity surveillance network precisely while under oversight<sup>102</sup>. KCSO's designation as the “deadliest police force in America” by *The Guardian*, combined with a 32% increase in personnel complaints from 288 in 2024 to 382 in 2025<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>, provides pattern evidence consistent with jurisdictions that have received federal investigation.

The DOJ Special Litigation Section follows a structured process: preliminary inquiry (3-6 months), formal investigation (12-18 months), public findings letter, negotiation of reform agreements (6-12 months), and consent decree implementation (5-10+ years)<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. The probability of initiation depends heavily on political priorities; the current DOJ has taken a more limited approach to pattern-or-practice enforcement compared to the prior administration<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. Strategic pathways include congressional requests from California's delegation, referral by the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of California, community coalition petition, or coordination with the CA DOJ.

### *8.1.2 FBI Civil Rights Criminal Investigation: 18 U.S.C. § 242 and § 241*

The primary federal criminal statute for prosecuting law enforcement misconduct is 18 U.S.C. § 242, which criminalizes willful deprivation of constitutional rights under color of law<sup>103</sup>. A conviction requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of three elements: deprivation of a constitutionally protected right, willfulness, and action under color of law<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. The willfulness requirement, established in *Screws v. United States*, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), demands proof that the officer “knew what he/she was doing was wrong and against the law and decided to do it anyway”<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. When death results, § 242 carries penalties of up to life imprisonment<sup>104</sup>. Section 241 provides a parallel conspiracy charge where two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, or intimidate any person in the free exercise of constitutional rights.

Federal prosecution of § 242 cases remains extraordinarily rare. In the first seven months of FY 2020, federal prosecutors filed § 242 charges in only 27 cases<sup>105</sup>. Research shows that of 10,129 civil rights complaints received by the DOJ during 1996, charges were filed in seventy-nine cases, only twenty-two involving official misconduct<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. Likelihood: 15-25%.

The strategic value of criminal referral extends beyond prosecution probability. A § 242 referral creates a federal record of misconduct that supports future pattern-or-practice investigations, triggers FBI documentation discoverable in civil litigation, generates media attention, and establishes predicate facts for civil RICO. The Porterville incident presents specific support: a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim under *Graham v. Connor*, the

---

<sup>102</sup> <https://kcsomonitoring.info/documents-and-reports/>

<sup>103</sup> U.S. Department of Justice. <https://www.justice.gov/crt/law-enforcement-misconduct>

<sup>104</sup> Columbia Law Review. <https://columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Yeomans-Georgina.pdf>

<sup>105</sup> [tracreports.org](https://tracreports.org). <https://tracreports.org/tracreports/crim/615/>

color-of-law element through KCSO SWAT’s official capacity, and the willfulness element through Sheriff Youngblood’s public acknowledgment that the killing was intentional.

### 8.1.3 False Claims Act: Qui Tam for Grant Fraud

The False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733, presents one of the most potent and underutilized federal mechanisms. KCSO has continued receiving federal grants — DOJ COPS, Byrne JAG, and DHS grants — throughout the stipulated judgment period, with each application requiring express certification of constitutional compliance <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. These certifications are materially false when submitted by an agency under formal stipulated judgment for pattern-and-practice civil rights violations <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>.

The FCA’s scienter element, clarified in *United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc.*, 598 U.S. 739 (2023), turns on subjective beliefs — not what an objectively reasonable person might have known <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. KCSO’s sheriff acknowledged 68 items of non-compliance while the department continued certifying compliance on grant applications <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. This conduct satisfies “reckless disregard” — submitting claims while conscious of a “substantial and unjustifiable risk” that they are false <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. Materiality is equally clear: under *Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar*, 579 U.S. 176 (2016), constitutional compliance is the “essence of the bargain” for law enforcement grants <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. The DOJ’s Civil Rights Fraud Initiative, established in May 2025, confirms this materiality by using the FCA to pursue recipients who “knowingly violate federal civil rights laws” <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>.

A qui tam action under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) enables a relator with non-public knowledge of false certifications to bring suit on behalf of the United States <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. Recovery includes treble damages plus per-claim penalties of \$14,308-\$28,619 <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. Each grant application, progress report, reimbursement request, and annual certification constitutes a separate violation. A qualified relator — a current or former KCSO employee, county administrator, or whistleblower — would be entitled to 15-30% of any recovery <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. The statute of limitations allows actions within six years of violation or three years of government knowledge, but never more than ten years <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. All grants since December 2020 remain within the limitations period.

## 8.2 State and Administrative Mechanisms

### 8.2.1 POST Decertification Under SB 2

Senate Bill 2, effective January 1, 2022, transformed California police accountability by creating a statewide system for revocation of peace officer certifications due to serious misconduct <sup>106</sup>. The Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) can revoke certifications for abuse of power including excessive force, dishonesty including false statements, demonstrating bias, and failure to intervene <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. The standard is clear and convincing evidence.

---

<sup>106</sup> ca.gov. <https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/media/accountability-09052024.pdf>

KCSO presents multiple targets. Officer John D. Badoud surrendered his POST certification on June 14, 2024, while former lieutenant David Wesley Hubbard was decertified for “serious misconduct” — only the second officer in California to face imminent decertification under SB 2 **Error! Bookmark not defined.** A KCSO deputy submitted a sworn statement to POST alleging that KCSO “refuses to believe they have a problem” and that internal affairs investigators tipped off subject officers as “standard operating procedure” **Error! Bookmark not defined.** The 382 complaints against sworn officers in 2025 represent substantial referral material **Error! Bookmark not defined.** Even elected sheriffs are subject to decertification; Youngblood’s public endorsement of the intentional Morales killing, combined with sustained findings during the stipulated judgment period, could support proceedings. As of August 2024, POST had initiated 345 certification actions **Error! Bookmark not defined.** Likelihood: 55-65% for officers with documented sustained findings.

### *8.2.2 CA DOJ Stipulated Judgment Enforcement*

The existing stipulated judgment provides enforcement mechanisms not yet fully activated. The Superior Court of Kern County (Case No. BCV-20-102971) can hold KCSO in contempt, including fines, imprisonment for up to one year, and mandatory compliance orders **Error! Bookmark not defined.** The monitoring team (Evident Change) can escalate findings and recommend court action **Error! Bookmark not defined.** Critically, the court has authority to modify the judgment to add requirements, including the aviation operations oversight provisions the current agreement entirely lacks.

The February 2026 extension to 2028 was granted because KCSO failed to achieve substantial compliance on 68 items across 8 areas including Use of Force Policy, Canine Policy, Searches and Seizures, Supervisor oversight, and community policing **Error! Bookmark not defined.** This judicial determination provides the evidentiary foundation for contempt proceedings. A motion to modify the judgment to include aviation operations oversight, armored vehicle protocols, and aerial surveillance accountability would close the gaps KCSO has exploited. Likelihood: 45-55%.

### *8.2.3 Budget Leverage: Kern County Board of Supervisors*

The Kern County Board of Supervisors approved a \$345 million budget for the Sheriff’s Department for FY 2025-2026 **Error! Bookmark not defined.** The Board has exclusive authority to approve the sheriff’s budget and can allocate funding conditionally, though it cannot exercise line-item veto — the budget must be approved or denied as a whole <sup>107</sup>.

The Board can condition budget approval on demonstrated compliance with the stipulated judgment, require monitoring team reports as a condition of authorization (the monitoring team costs taxpayers more than \$1 million annually) **Error! Bookmark not defined.**, mandate civil liability reserves given the \$30.5 million Lewis verdict and \$57.8 million in total settlements **Error! Bookmark not defined.**, require detailed reporting on helicopter acquisitions, and condition salary increases on completion of mandated training **Error! Bookmark not defined.** Kern County’s voter registration — 34.7% Democratic, 36.3% Republican, 29% no party

---

<sup>107</sup> UCLA Blueprint. <https://blueprint.ucla.edu/sketch/whats-a-supervisor-to-do/>

preference<sup>108</sup>— creates a competitive environment where fiscal responsibility arguments can mobilize cross-partisan pressure. Likelihood: 40-50%, contingent on a coalition of at least three supervisors willing to use budget authority conditionally.

### 8.3 Civil Litigation Strategy

#### 8.3.1 Monell Liability: Youngblood's Statements as Policy Evidence

Civil rights litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides the primary private enforcement mechanism. For institutional reform, the critical doctrine is *Monell* liability — municipalities can be held liable for constitutional violations caused by official policy, custom, or practice<sup>109</sup>. Sheriff Youngblood's statements constitute direct policy evidence under *Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati*, 475 U.S. 469 (1986): his 2006 statement that it is “better financially to kill” suspects than wound them, his 2026 defense of the BearCat killing with “all bets are off,” and his complaints about how long compliance should take after five years of failure — all are statements by the final policymaker establishing a custom of deliberate indifference<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. The \$30.5 million Lewis verdict, in which a federal jury found Deputy Jason Ayala “used excessive and unreasonable force,” demonstrates juror willingness to hold KCSO accountable with pattern evidence<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. Individual § 1983 actions carry a 70-80% likelihood of favorable verdict or settlement.

#### 8.3.2 Civil RICO: 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act provides a private right of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) for “any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962”<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. Recovery includes mandatory treble damages and attorney's fees. The Supreme Court's 2025 decision in *Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn*, 604 U.S. \_\_\_ (2025), expanded recoverability by holding that civil RICO plaintiffs may seek damages for business or property loss regardless of whether the loss resulted from personal injury<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>.

The Kern County Aviation Network satisfies all RICO enterprise elements under *Boyle v. United States*, 556 U.S. 938 (2009): common purpose (coordinated aerial surveillance), ongoing organization (118,773 violations in 30 days), and ascertainable structure (financial relationships connecting KCSO, ALF IX LLC, and the Delaware LLC network through RESIDCO)<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. Predicate acts include wire fraud (transponder spoofing on N786FA), identity theft (shell company registration fraud), money laundering (Delaware LLC layering), and aviation safety violations (1,365,336 detections below 1,000 feet)<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>. The pattern requirement — relationship plus continuity under *H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.*, 492 U.S. 229 (1989) — is satisfied through the same actors, methods, and purpose operating over an extended period<sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>.

---

<sup>108</sup> CA.gov. <https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/ror/154day-presprim-2024/county.pdf>

<sup>109</sup> lawfaremedia.org. <https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/heres-more-important-reform-ending-qualified-immunity>

The novel application of RICO to law enforcement aviation conduct carries litigation risk. Likelihood: 15-25%. However, the strategic value of civil RICO discovery extends beyond the claim: broad discovery of financial relationships between KCSO, ALF IX LLC, RESIDCO, and AE Industrial Partners, subpoena power over Delaware LLC records, and deposition of network coordination personnel — evidence supporting parallel FCA, § 1983, and state enforcement actions.

### 8.3.3 Legal Pathways Matrix

Mechanism	Standard of Proof	Potential Remedy	Likelihood	Timeline
DOJ pattern-or-practice investigation (42 U.S.C. § 14141)	Preponderance for civil findings	Federal consent decree; court-enforceable reforms	40-50% <b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>	3-6 years
FBI criminal referral — § 242 (willful deprivation)	Beyond reasonable doubt	Up to life imprisonment if death results	15-25% <b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>	1-3 years
FBI criminal referral — § 241 (conspiracy)	Beyond reasonable doubt	Up to 10 years imprisonment	10-20% <sup>110</sup>	1-3 years
False Claims Act qui tam (31 U.S.C. § 3730(b))	Preponderance; subjective scienter per <i>SuperValu</i>	Treble damages + \$14,308-\$28,619 per claim	25-35% <b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>	2-4 years
POST decertification (SB 2)	Clear and convincing evidence	Permanent revocation of peace officer certification	55-65% <b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>	6-18 months
CA DOJ SJ contempt/modification	Preponderance; court discretion	Fines, imprisonment up to 1 year, compliance orders	45-55% <b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>	6-12 months
County budget	Political (majority)	Conditional appropriation	40-50% <b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>	3-6 months

<sup>110</sup> KOMO. <https://komonews.com/news/nation-world/california-deputy-tulare-county-detective-randy-hoppert-killed-serving-eviction-notice-standoff-ends-with-suspect-david-morales-run-over-bearcat-vehicle-porterville>

Mechanism	Standard of Proof	Potential Remedy	Likelihood	Timeline
conditionality	vote of Board)	n; reform-linked funding	defined.	
§ 1983 Monell liability	Preponderance; official policy causes violation	Compensatory and punitive damages; injunctive relief	70-80% <b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>	18-36 months
Civil RICO (18 U.S.C. § 1964(c))	Preponderance; pattern + proximate causation	Mandatory treble damages + attorney's fees	15-25% <b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>	24-48 months
Federal receivership	Clear and convincing persistent non-compliance	Court-appointed receiver assumes operational control	10-20% near term; 35-45% over 5-10 years <b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>	5-10+ years

The matrix reveals a clear stratification of risk and reward. The highest-likelihood pathways — § 1983 Monell litigation (70-80%) and POST decertification (55-65%) — offer targeted remedies but do not restructure the institution. The lowest-likelihood pathways — federal receivership (10-20% near term) and § 241 conspiracy (10-20%) — carry the greatest transformative potential but face the steepest barriers. The False Claims Act qui tam occupies a strategic middle ground: moderate likelihood with the unique advantage of financial incentives that attract qualified relators and generate self-funding enforcement.

The temporal dimension is equally important. Budget conditionality (3-6 months) and POST complaints (6-18 months) produce pressure within an election cycle. The stipulated judgment expires in 2028, converging with AE Industrial Partners Fund II's term expiration and the sheriff's election under AB 759's six-year term structure **Error! Bookmark not defined.** This convergence creates a window — approximately 18 months — in which coordinated action across multiple pathways can achieve what no single mechanism can: the dismantling of the accountability evasion architecture itself.

The recommended strategy prioritizes simultaneous activation of moderate-likelihood, shorter-timeline pathways — POST decertification, budget conditionality, and contempt proceedings — while building evidentiary records for longer-timeline federal actions. The qui tam action deserves particular attention because it creates private enforcement independent of DOJ political will or CA DOJ resource constraints. A single qualified relator, armed with knowledge of KCSO's false grant certifications, can activate the full financial

machinery of the FCA — trebling damages and imposing per-claim penalties that make continued non-compliance prohibitively expensive. The DOJ’s Civil Rights Fraud Initiative, launched May 2025, signals federal intent to support precisely this type of enforcement [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#)

---

## 9. Recommendations: Dismantling the Architecture

The preceding eight chapters documented a system designed for evasion. The Stipulated Judgment’s 68 items regulate firearms and canines but say nothing about armored vehicles or aerial surveillance — gaps KCSO exploited to purchase \$12 million in helicopters and deploy a BearCat as a lethal weapon in Porterville. [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) The Monitoring Team’s diplomatic language neutralized public pressure while five of eight compliance areas remained deficient after five years. [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) The financial web connecting KCERA to AE Industrial Partners creates a circular flow rewarding equipment procurement over personnel. [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) The surveillance network’s 118,773 aviation violations operate entirely outside SJ scope. [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) And 54 fatal shootings produced zero sustained findings while taxpayers funded \$57.8 million in settlements. [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) No single reform can dismantle this architecture. The ten cross-dimensional insights and ten legal pathways converge on one conclusion: accountability requires simultaneous, coordinated action across federal, state, county, and electoral mechanisms. The recommendations below are organized by timeline and actor. They are specific enough to execute today.

### 9.1 Immediate Actions (0–6 Months)

#### 9.1.1 DOJ: Expand the Stipulated Judgment

The California Department of Justice must file a motion to modify the Stipulated Judgment (Kern County Superior Court Case No. BCV-20-102971) to add three categories of oversight currently absent: armored vehicle deployment protocols, aviation operations, and aerial surveillance accountability encompassing all aircraft operating in support of KCSO regardless of ownership. The court has modification authority under California Code of Civil Procedure § 576, and the DOJ’s March 2026 filing documenting deficiencies in five of eight areas justifies expansion. [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) The modification must include financial penalties for non-compliance. The current SJ contains no monetary sanctions — a structural defect enabling KCSO to treat \$6–7 million in monitoring costs as the price of organizational autonomy. [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) DOJ should seek daily fines for missed deadlines under the contempt framework, which permits fines and imprisonment up to one year. [Error! Bookmark not defined.](#) The modification should also require KCSO to obtain monitor approval before acquiring any tactical equipment not explicitly addressed in the judgment. Specific proposed language: “The agency shall not deploy any equipment or tactic not explicitly addressed in this judgment without prior monitor approval and public disclosure.” This closes the oversight gap exploitation pattern documented in Chapter 7.

### 9.1.2 California Legislature: Pass SB 1319 and Amend AB 481

Senate Bill 1319, the “Private Equity Sunshine Act” introduced in April 2026, must pass in the 2026 session. <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>The bill would require public pension funds to disclose fees, expenses, and performance data for alternative investments — the transparency mechanism that could expose the KCERA → AE Industrial → aerospace procurement circuit. Current law shields these investments under Gov Code § 7928.710. <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>The legislature must also amend Assembly Bill 481 to replace its enumerated equipment list with a functional definition: any armored, weaponized, or surveillance-capable platform acquired through federal surplus, direct purchase, or inter-agency agreement. This captures BearCat vehicles and aerial surveillance platforms under legislative oversight. <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>#### 9.1.3 KCSO: Immediate Records Disclosure

KCSO must release, within 45 days as required by SB 1421 and SB 16, all body-worn camera footage, BearCat video recordings, and radio transcripts from the April 9, 2026 Porterville incident. <sup>111 112</sup>KCSO’s withholding violates Penal Code § 832.7 and deprives the public of information necessary to evaluate the constitutional justification for David Morales’s killing. <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>Community organizations should file CPRA requests for: (1) body-worn camera footage from all KCSO SWAT personnel at Porterville; (2) BearCat-mounted camera recordings; (3) radio transmissions between KCSO SWAT, Tulare County SO, and incident command; (4) after-action reports; and (5) all KCSO policies governing BearCat deployment. If denied, petitioners should seek attorney fees under Government Code § 6259(d) and file parallel requests with Tulare County SO, which participated in the operation and is independently subject to CPRA.

## 9.2 Medium-Term Reforms (6–18 Months)

### 9.2.1 Federal: Freeze Grants; Activate Qui Tam

DOJ and DHS must suspend all Byrne JAG, COPS, and homeland security grants to KCSO until sustained SJ compliance is demonstrated. KCSO continued receiving federal grants requiring constitutional compliance certifications throughout the stipulated judgment period — certifications materially false under *Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar*, 579 U.S. 176 (2016). <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>The DOJ Civil Rights Fraud Initiative, established May 2025, exists precisely to address this pattern. <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>A qui tam action under the False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)) should be initiated by a qualified relator. <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>Recovery includes treble damages plus per-claim penalties of \$14,308–\$28,619. <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>Each grant application, progress report, and annual certification constitutes a separate violation; all grants since December 2020 remain within the six-year limitations period. The scienter standard — subjective belief of falsity per *SuperValu*, 598 U.S. 739 (2023) — is met by Youngblood’s own public acknowledgment of non-compliance while certifications continued. <sup>Error! Bookmark not defined.</sup>#### 9.2.2 County: Forensic Audit and Budget Conditionality

---

<sup>111</sup> California Legislative Information.

[https://leginfo.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill\\_id=201720180SB1421](https://leginfo.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB1421)

<sup>112</sup> Liebert Cassidy Whitmore. <https://www.lcwlegal.com/news/sb-16-increases-transparency-regarding-peace-officer-misconduct-records-implements-additional-background-check-and-record-retention-requirements/>

The Kern County Board of Supervisors must authorize a forensic audit of KCSO budget allocations for 2020–2026, tracing the \$12 million helicopter purchase, \$6–7 million in monitoring costs, settlement payment structures, and inter-agency contract revenue including KCSO deployment to Tulare County for Porterville. **Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined.** The Board should impose personnel-to-equipment ratio requirements as a condition of budget approval. KCSO maintains a \$12 million aviation fleet while operating with 21–37 percent deputy vacancy rates. **Error! Bookmark not defined.** The Board has exclusive budget approval authority and can condition equipment authorization on demonstrated staffing levels. **Error! Bookmark not defined.** A coalition of three supervisors should frame this around fiscal responsibility: the \$30.5 million Lewis verdict equals 8.8% of KCSO’s annual budget, and \$57.8 million in total settlements represents a fiscal emergency. **Error! Bookmark not defined.** #### 9.2.3 State: POST Decertification and Monitor Reform

POST must expand decertification proceedings under SB 2 to include all KCSO officers with sustained findings of serious misconduct, including officers involved in the Morales killing. **Error! Bookmark not defined.** POST had initiated 345 certification actions as of August 2024; KCSO’s 382 complaints in 2025 represent substantial referral material. **Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined.** The standard is clear and convincing evidence — already met where a KCSO deputy submitted sworn statements alleging IA investigators tip off subject officers as standard operating procedure. **Error! Bookmark not defined.** The legislature must mandate plain-language public reporting by all monitoring teams. Current MT reports describe KCSO as “cooperative” while documenting five years of failure. **Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined.** Mandated plain-language summaries at an eighth-grade reading level, with traffic-light indicators for each compliance area and explicit delay responsibility, would break the monitor capture → public apathy pipeline.

### 9.3 Structural Transformation (18–36 Months)

#### 9.3.1 Electoral: The 2028 Sheriff Race

Three timelines converge in 2028: the SJ extension expires, AE Industrial Partners Fund II terminates in May 2028, and Youngblood’s AB 759 extended term ends January 8, 2029 — with the election in November 2028 under a six-year term. **Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined.** Reform advocates must launch a four-component campaign: (1) recruit a credible challenger with law enforcement credentials by early 2027; (2) educate voters that the winner serves until 2034; (3) mobilize high-turnout Democratic-leaning cities — Delano (D+45.9%) and Arvin (D+49.5%); and (4) fund independent expenditure campaigns framing \$57.8 million in settlements as fiscal mismanagement. **Error! Bookmark not defined.** <sup>113</sup> **Error! Bookmark not defined.** #### 9.3.2 Legislative: Catch-All Consent Decree Provisions

The legislature must enact catch-all provisions for all future SJ and consent decree agreements: (1) agencies under decree must obtain monitor approval before acquiring tactical equipment not addressed in the governing agreement; (2) all aviation and aerial surveillance operations must be disclosed to monitors within 72 hours; and (3) deployment of unapproved equipment or tactics constitutes prima facie evidence of non-

---

<sup>113</sup> wikipedia.org. [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California\\_locations\\_by\\_voter\\_registration](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/California_locations_by_voter_registration)

compliance. This prevents future agencies from exploiting oversight gaps as KCSO has done. <sup>114</sup> Error! Bookmark not defined. ##### 9.3.3 Institutional: Civilian Oversight and KCERA Divestment

The Board must establish an independent Office of Sheriff Oversight with NACOLE-model investigative authority: independent investigation of serious use-of-force incidents, systemic audit authority over SWAT and aviation programs, and binding participation in use-of-force policy development — all with subpoena power. <sup>115</sup>The existing CAC collapsed from 35 members to approximately 22 with four resignations over dysfunction precisely because it lacked these authorities. Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined. KCERA must divest from AE Industrial Partners Fund II at its May 2028 natural termination and adopt conflict-of-interest screening prohibiting investment in PE funds whose portfolio companies sell equipment to Kern County law enforcement. Error! Bookmark not defined. Divestment at termination avoids early-withdrawal penalties while ending the structural incentive for pension returns to depend on law enforcement aviation expansion.

#### 9.4 Summary: The Coordinated Action Matrix

The recommendations above are not independent. They create reinforcing effects: civil litigation generates discovery supporting DOJ investigations and POST complaints; federal investigations enable Board budget conditionality; POST decertification weakens the incumbent for 2028; and transparency requests generate media coverage supporting electoral strategy. Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined. **Table**

#### **9.1: Coordinated Action Matrix — All Recommendations by Actor, Timeline, Mechanism, and Interdependency**

Actor	Action	Timeline	Legal/Policy Mechanism	Interdependency	Priority
CA DOJ	File motion to modify SJ: add armored vehicle, aviation, and aerial surveillance oversight; impose financial	0–6 months	CCP § 576; contempt framework Error! Bookmark not defined.	Enables all downstream SJ enforcement; closes gaps exploited in Porterville	Critical

<sup>114</sup> AP News. <https://apnews.com/article/trump-consent-decrees-police-reform-floyd-breonna-03fc5ffd24495d8610228759bc6af31a>

<sup>115</sup> nacole.org. [https://www.nacole.org/oversight\\_models](https://www.nacole.org/oversight_models)

Actor	Action	Timeline	Legal/Policy Mechanism	Interdependency	Priority
CA Legislature	penalties Pass SB 1319; amend AB 481 to functional equipment definition	0–6 months	Legislative vote; Gov Code § 7928.710 amendment <sup>Error!</sup> <b>Bookmark not defined.</b> <sup>Error!</sup> <b>Bookmark not defined.</b>	Exposes pension conflicts; prevents procurement in regulatory gaps	Critical
KCSO / Courts	Release all body camera, BearCat video, and radio transcripts from Porterville under SB 1421/SB 16	0–6 months	Penal Code § 832.7; CPRA <sup>Error!</sup> <b>Bookmark not defined.</b> <sup>Error!</sup> <b>Bookmark not defined.</b>	Generates evidence for § 242 referrals, civil litigation, public pressure	Critical
Federal DOJ/DHS	Freeze Byrne JAG, COPS, DHS grants until compliance; activate Civil Rights Fraud Initiative	6–18 months	FCA 31 U.S.C. § 3730; grant conditionality <sup>Error!</sup> <b>Bookmark not defined.</b> <sup>116</sup>	Removes financial subsidy of non-compliance; creates Board fiscal pressure	High
Federal / Relator	File FCA qui tam	6–18 months	31 U.S.C. § 3730(b);	Self-funding	High

<sup>116</sup> Houston Law Review. <https://houstonlawreview.org/article/36544-money-talks-conditions-for-byrne-jag-funds-to-insure-the-removal-of-the-bad-apples-in-policing>

Actor	Action	Timeline	Legal/Policy Mechanism	Interdependency	Priority
	for false grant certifications		<i>SuperValu</i> scienter Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined.	enforcement; treble damages create existential financial threat	
Kern County Board	Forensic audit of KCSO budget 2020–2026; impose personnel-to-equipment ratios	6–18 months	Budget conditionality authority Error! Bookmark not defined.	Exposes fund diversion from staffing to equipment; creates electoral accountability	High
CA POST	Expand SB 2 decertification to all officers with sustained findings; process 2025 complaints	6–18 months	Penal Code § 13510.8 Error! Bookmark not defined.	Removes misconduct-tainted officers; weakens incumbent for 2028	High
CA Legislature	Mandate plain-language MT public reporting with traffic-light indicators	6–18 months	Legislative enactment	Breaks monitor capture → apathy pipeline; enables organizing	High

Actor	Action	Timeline	Legal/Policy Mechanism	Interdependency	Priority
Reform Coalition	2028 sheriff race campaign: recruitment, voter education, mobilization	18–36 months	Electoral; AB 759 timing <b>Error!</b> <b>Bookmark not defined.</b>	Converges with SJ expiration and AE Fund II termination	Critical
CA Legislature	Enact catch-all consent decree provisions for all future CA agreements	18–36 months	Legislative enactment	Prevents future oversight gap exploitation	Medium
Kern County Board	Establish independent Office of Sheriff Oversight with subpoena power	18–36 months	County ordinance; NACOLE model <b>Error!</b> <b>Bookmark not defined.</b>	Permanent institutional accountability beyond SJ expiration	High
KCERA	Divest from AE Industrial Fund II at May 2028 termination; adopt conflict screening	18–36 months	Fiduciary duty; investment policy <b>Error!</b> <b>Bookmark not defined.</b>	Ends pension-equipment conflict at natural termination	High

The matrix reveals three principles. First, the 0–6 month actions are prerequisites — without SJ modification, AB 481 expansion, and records disclosure, the evidentiary foundation for subsequent reforms collapses. Second, the 2028 convergence is non-repeatable: SJ expiration, AE Fund II termination, and the AB 759 election align in a single year, and failure to exploit this alignment means waiting six more years for the next sheriff

cycle. **Error! Bookmark not defined.**Third, financial mechanisms — grant freezes, qui tam penalties, budget conditionality, and KCERA divestment — may prove more effective than procedural reforms because they alter the investment calculus that has made non-compliance profitable. **Error! Bookmark not defined. Error! Bookmark not defined.**The architecture of accountability evasion was not constructed in a day. Dismantling it will not happen through a single lawsuit, election, or legislative act. It will happen when federal investigators, state legislators, county supervisors, POST commissioners, plaintiff attorneys, community organizers, and pension fiduciaries act in coordination — each applying pressure at a different point, each reinforcing the others, until the structure can no longer sustain itself. The evidence is compiled. The pathways are mapped. The timelines are converging. What remains is action.

---